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PRESERVING THE AUTONOMY AND
FUNCTION OF THE GRAND JURY:
UNITED STATES v. WILLIAMS
The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution' guarantees
an individual the right to indictment2 by a grand jury prior to trial for all
capital or other infamous crimes.' The Framers of the Constitution in-
tended the grand jury to serve the dual function of bringing to trial those
1. U.S. CONsT. amend. V. The Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o person shall be
held to answer for a capital, or other infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indict-
ment of a Grand Jury." Id. The Fifth Amendment right to indictment by a grand jury
applies to federal, not state, criminal proceedings. In Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516
(1884), the United States Supreme Court upheld a California murder prosecution com-
menced by a prosecutor's information. In so doing, the Court declined to incorporate the
grand jury requirement into the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id at
538. Thus, the states are free to initiate criminal proceedings by other methods. See
FRANK B. LATHAM, AMERICAN JUsTICE ON TRIAL 49-51 (1972); James R. Acker, The
Grand Jury and Capital Punishment. Rethinking the Role of an Ancient Institution Under
the Modem Jurisprudence of Death, 21 PAC. LJ. 31,50-56,59 (1989) (criticizing the reason-
ing of Hurtado and suggesting that individuals accused of capital crimes in state court be
guaranteed the right to grand jury indictment in order to protect against the arbitrary exer-
cise of prosecutorial discretion); Lewis P. Watts, Jr., Grand Jury: Sleeping Watchdog or
Expensive Antique?, 37 N.C. L. Rav. 290, 294 (1959).
2. An indictment is a statement returned by the grand jury that sets forth the basic
elements of the offense charged and is signed by the prosecutor. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(c).
An indictment satisfies the Sixth Amendment requirement that an accused be informed of
the charges against him. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI; see Russell v. United States, 369 U.S.
749, 763-68 (1962). An indictment constitutes no evidence of guilt. See United States v.
Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616, 622 (2d Cir. 1979). A defendant may waive the right to a grand
jury indictment for any crime not punishable by death. FED. R. CaiM. P. (7)(b).
The government may prosecute defendants for minor federal crimes and misdemeanors
by filing an information. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(a); see Duke v. United States, 301 U.S. 492,
495 (1937) (holding that prosecution for misdemeanor not punishable by more than one
year in prison may be initiated by information). An information is a concise written state-
ment made by a prosecutor without leave of court charging a defendant with criminal con-
duct. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(a); see PAUL S. DIAMOND, FEDERAL GRAND JURY PRACTICE &
PROCEDURE 77 (1991); Beauchamp E. Brogan, Note, Criminal Procedure-Should the
Grand Jury System Be Abolished?, 45 Ky. Li. 151, 158 (1956) (criticizing the grand jury
process of indictment and proposing that an information is the "better method" to institute
criminal charges); see also infra note 81 and accompanying text.
3. U.S. Corsr. amend. V. An "otherwise infamous crime" is any crime punishable
by more than one year's imprisonment. FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(a); see Ex parte Wilson, 114
U.S. 417, 429 (1885); United States v. Russell, 585 F.2d 368, 370 (8th Cir. 1978).
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rightly accused and protecting the innocent from unjust prosecution.4
Despite the fact that the grand jury has long been a cornerstone of An-
glo-American criminal jurisprudence,' it has recently suffered increas-
ingly sharp attacks on its legitimacy.6 Scholars suggest that the growing
complexity of crime and the ascending role of the prosecutor7 have ren-
dered the grand jury a victim of prosecutorial abuse and manipulation.
8
4. Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 687-90 (1972). The grand jury fulfills its protec-
tive function by permitting the government to prosecute an accused only after a grand jury
has found it probable that a crime has been committed and that the accused committed the
crime. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343 (1974).
In Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962), Chief Justice Warren noted:
Historically, this body [the grand jury] has been regarded as a primary security
to the innocent against hasty, malicious and oppressive persecution; it serves the
invaluable function in our society of standing between the accuser and the ac-
cused, whether the latter be an individual, minority group, or other, to determine
whether a charge is founded upon reason or was dictated by an intimidating
power or by malice and personal ill will.
Id. at 390; see also Bracy v. United States, 435 U.S. 1301, 1302 (1978) (stating the purpose
of the grand jury to be determining whether probable cause exists to bring an accused to
trial); United States v. DiGrazia, 213 F. Supp. 232, 235 (N.D. Ill. 1963) ("The Grand Jury
exists as an integral part of Anglo-American jurisprudence for the express purpose of as-
suring that persons will not be charged with crimes simply because of the zeal, malice,
partiality or other prejudice of the prosecutor, the government or private persons").
5. See infra notes 66-111 and accompanying text.
6. See Brogan, supra note 2, at 154-60; infra notes 7-9 and accompanying text.
7. See United States v. Linton, 502 F. Supp. 861, 865 (D. Nev. 1980) (stating that
"'[t]he passive role of the modern grand jury is perhaps an inevitable function of our com-
plex urban society. Nevertheless, at its best the grand jury is capable of acting as some-
thing more than a rubber stamp."' (quoting 8 JAMES W. MooRE AL., MooRe's
FEDERAL PRACTCE 6.02[1], at 6-12 (1976))); United States v. Kleen Laundry & Clean-
ers, Inc., 381 F. Supp. 519, 521 (E.D.N.Y. 1974) ("Today the grand jury's independence in
the criminal justice system has declined with the increasing complexity of crime and the
growth of the role of prosecutors, professional police and investigative forces."); Roger T.
Brice, Comment, Grand Jury Proceedings: The Prosecutor, the Trial Judge, and Undue In-
fluence, 39 U. Cmi. L. REv. 761, 764 (1972) (asserting that although the grand jury's reli-
ance upon professional investigatory agencies and the prosecutor to gather evidence "has
increased efficiency in investigation and decision making .... [I]t has made the modern
grand jury a generally more passive instrument than its precursors." (footnote omitted)).
8. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973). In Dionisio, the majority acknowl-
edged that "[t]he grand jury may not always serve its historic role as a protective bulwark
standing solidly between the ordinary citizen and an overzealous prosecutor." Id. at 17.
Echoing the majority in Dionisio, Justice Douglas stated in United States v. Mara, 410 U.S.
19 (1973), that "[ilt is, indeed, common knowledge that the grand jury, having been con-
ceived as a bulwark between the citizen and the Government, is now a tool of the Execu-
tive." Id. at 23 (Douglas, ., dissenting). Justice Douglas quoted approvingly Judge
Campbell's statement that "'[a]ny experienced prosecutor will admit that he can indict
anybody at anytime for almost anything before any grand jury."' Id. (quoting William J.
Campbell, Delays in Criminal Cases, 55 F.R.D. 229, 253 (1972)).
One commentator, discussing the erosion of the grand jury's protective function, noted
[Vol. 43:311
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Although some critics have called for the abolition of the grand jury,9
the concern of protecting the individual from wrongful prosecution is one about
which grand juries in general show little interest. It is edifying indeed to a new
prosecutor to learn how willing people are to let trouble descend upon their fel-
lows. In positions of authority, many are prepossessed by fancied obligations to
"back up" the police, to stop "mollycoddling," to "set examples." Attitudes of
understanding, of patient inquiry, of skeptical deliberation, so needed in the ser-
vice of justice, recede in the presence of duly constituted officials and are re-
placed by a passive acceptance of almost anything which seems to bear the
sovereign's seal of approval.
Melvin P. Antell, The Modem Grand Jury: Benighted Supergovemment, 51 A.B.A. J. 153,
154-55 (1965); see also LEwis KATZ Er AL., JusTICE Is THE CRIME: PRETRIAL DELAY IN
FELONY CASES 48, 121 (1972) (stating that the grand jury is "a rubber stamp for the prose-
cutor"); Ovio C. Lewis, The Grand Jury: A Critical Evaluation, 13 AKRON L. REv. 33, 57
(1979) (stating that the grand jury is "the prosecutor's darling"); Wayne L. Morse, A Sur-
vey of the Grand Jury System (Part 11), 10 OR. L. Rnv. 217, 329 (1931) (stating that grand
juries "are likely to be a fifth wheel in the administration of criminal justice in that they
tend to stamp with approval, and often uncritically, the wishes of the prosecuting attor-
ney"); Thomas P. Sullivan & Robert D. Nachman, If It Ain't Broke, Don't Fix It: Why the
Grand Jury's Accusatory Function Should Not Be Changed, 75 J. CnIM. L. & CRIMINoL.
ooY 1047, 1050 (1984) ("When a federal prosecutor seeks an indictment from the grand
jury, almost invariably the grand jury returns a true bill. Indeed, 'no bills' are so rare that
prosecutors regard them as freak occurrences." (footnote omitted)); Peter F. Vaira, The
Role of the Prosecutor Inside the Grand Jury Room. Where Is the Foul Line?, 75 J. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 1129, 1129 (1984) (stating that the grand jury has been described as "no
longer being an independent body"). But see W. Wilson White, In Defense of the Grand
Jury, 25 PA. B. AsS'N Q. 260,262,264 (1954) (defending the legitimacy and necessity of the
grand jury).
9. See, e.g., NATIONAL COMM'N ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT
ON PROsECTrnON 36-37 (1931) (finding that because the grand jury system "wastes money,
time, and energy," it should be "done away with" and only occasionally used "as a general
investigating body" to inquire into official misconduct or "large conspiracies") [hereinafter
REPORT ON PROSECUTION]; Antell, supra note 8, at 155 (arguing that the grand jury should
be abolished because it is archaic and a potential oppressor); William J. Campbell, Elimi-
nate the Grand Jury, 64 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 174, 178-79 (1973) (arguing that the
grand jury is the "alter ego of the prosecutor," no longer serves a protective function, and
should be abolished by constitutional amendment); George Lawyer, Should the Grand Jury
System Be Abolished?, 15 YALE L.. 178, 187 (1906) (stating that "all crimes may safely be
instituted before an examining court, and that the presentment and indictment of the grand
jury are no longer necessary either to a prompt or to a certain and safe administration of
justice"); Lewis, supra note 8, at 34, 41 (arguing that "there is no better reason for the
continuation of a practice [indictment by grand jury] detrimental to the rights of the indi-
vidual than that it existed in the time of Henry II.... Accordingly, the only rational course
of action requires abolition of [the grand jury]"); Richard D. Younger, The Grand Jury
Under Attack, 46 J. CRiM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 26 (1955) (surveying efforts in England and
America to abolish the grand jury).
In the early 1800s, Jeremy Bentham and Robert Peel were the first to criticize the Eng-
lish grand jury. They argued that the grand jury was corrupt, inefficient, and a tool of the
wealthy. See 2 JEREMY BENTHAM, THE WORKs OF JEREMY BENTHAM 139-40, 171 (John
Bowring ed., 1962); see also RIcHARD D. YOUNGER, THE PEOPLE'S PANEL: THE GRAM
JURY IN THE UNrrnD STATES, 1634-1941, at 56-57 (1963). Although Parliament's efforts in
1834 and 1836 to restrict the use of grand juries failed, a strong movement to totally abolish
the grand jury in England began by the mid-nineteenth century. See YOUNGER, supra, at
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others have suggested procedural reforms to curb grand jury abuse and
restore fairness to its determinations of probable cause.' 0 One such sug-
gested reform calls for the prosecutor to disclose to the grand jury
substantial exculpatory evidence'1 in his possession.'2 The legality of es-
57; Nathan T. Elliff, Notes on the Abolition of the English Grand Jury, 29 J. CRiM. L. &
CRIMINOLOoY 3, 4-14 (1938) (presenting criticisms of the English grand jury and the events
culminating in its abolition); James P. Whyte, Is the Grand Jury Necessary?, 45 VA. L. Rlv.
461, 483 (1959). Parliament suspended grand jury proceedings in March 1917 because of
World War I. Elliff, supra, at 15; WJ. Heyting, The Abolition of Grand Juries in England,
19 A.B.A. J. 648 (1933). After the War, the House of Lords defeated by a vote of 184 to
149 a proposal in the Criminal Justice Bill of 1925 to abolish the grand jury. Elliff, supra,
at 19; Albert Lieck, Abolition of the Grand Jury in England, 25 J. CIM. L. & CRIUMOL-
OGY 623, 624 (1935). England finally abolished the grand jury, except for limited circum-
stances, by the Administration of Justice (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act of 1933. Elliff,
supra, at 20-21; Lieck, supra, at 624. Proponents of the 1933 Act rejected arguments that
the English grand jury protected individuals from state oppression and asserted that in
light of the rigorous preliminary examination of cases by justices, the subsequent screening
of the same cases by grand juries was unnecessary and too costly. Heyting, supra, at 649.
The grand jury in England was completely abolished by the Criminal Justice Act of 1948.
Acker, supra note 1, at 51 n.102.
Reflecting upon England's eradication of its grand jury system, Albert Lieck
commented:
The grand jury had long lagged superfluous on a stage where it had once played
a great part. Its performance had grown perfunctory, and its service a burden to
reluctant actors. During its last years it was kept in being only by that strong
sentiment among lawyers which resents change however salutary; but, though the
English people is [sic] patient, there is a certain vein of commonsense in its make-
up, which, in the long run, prevails.
Lieck, supra, at 623.
10. See The Grand Jury Reform Act of 1978: Hearings on S. 3405 Before the Subcomm.
on Administration, Practice and Procedure of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 154 (1978); Grand Jury Reform: Hearings on H.R. 94 Before the Subcomm.
on Immigration, Citizenship, and International Law of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
95th Cong., 1st Sess. 484 (1977); Peter Arenella, Reforming the Federal Grand Jury and the
State Preliminary Hearing to Prevent Conviction Without Adjudication, 78 MicH. L. REv.
463 (1980); Richard E. Gerstein & Laurie 0. Robinson, Remedy for the Grand Jury: Retain
but Reform, 64 A.B.A. J. 337 (1978).
11. "'Substantial exculpatory evidence"' has been defined as "evidence that clearly
negates guilt and that would change a grand jury's decision to charge a defendant with a
crime." United States v. Gressett, 773 F. Supp. 270, 276 (D. Kan. 1991) (citing United
States v. Reid, 911 F.2d 1456, 1460 (10th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1097 (1991)).
12. Several manuals for the guidance of prosecutors indicate that prosecutors should
reveal exculpatory evidence to grand juries. The United States Department of Justice
Manual, for instance, states:
Although neither statutory nor case law imposes upon the prosecutor a legal
obligation to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury, it is the Depart-
ment's internal policy to do so under many circumstances. For example, when a
prosecutor conducting a grand jury inquiry is personally aware of substantial evi-
dence which directly negates the guilt of a subject of the investigation, the prose-
cutor must present or otherwise disclose such evidence to the grand jury before
seeking an indictment against such a person.
[Vol. 43:311
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tablishing this particular reform by judicial fiat remained unsettled until
the United States Supreme Court ruled in United States v. Williams13 that
the imposition of this prosecutorial duty by federal courts was an im-
proper exercise of the courts' supervisory power.
14
Prior to Williams, the federal courts of appeals were split regarding the
duty of a prosecutor to disclose exculpatory evidence to a grand jury.15
The majority of federal circuits imposed no such duty.16 These courts
reasoned that since the proper setting for determining an accused's guilt
7 UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE MANuAL 9-11.233 (1992) (citations omitted);
see also MODEL RuL.rs OF PROrESSIONAL Co nucr Rule 3.3(d) (1992) ("In an ex parte
proceeding, a lawyer shall inform the tribunal of all material facts known to the lawyer
which will enable the tribunal to make an informed decision, whether or not the facts are
adverse."); NATIONAL Dismucr ATroREYs Ass'N, NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS
§ 60.2 (1991) ("In his capacity as advisor [to the grand jury], the prosecutor may appropri-
ately explain the law and express his opinion on the legal significance of the evidence but
should give due deference to the grand jury's status as an independent legal body."); STAN-
DARDS FOR CRImINAL JuSTIcE Standard 3-3.6 (1992) ("No prosecutor should knowingly
fail to disclose to the grand jury evidence which tends to negate guilt or mitigate the
offense.").
The American Bar Association (ABA), moreover, has drafted a model act of which
section 101, entitled Prosecutor's Duty to Reveal Exculpatory Evidence to the Grand Jury,
provides:
1. If the prosecutor is aware of exculpatory evidence, that is, evidence which,
if believed, tends to negate one of the material elements of the crime, he must
disclose and if feasible present such evidence to the grand jury.
2. If the prosecutor is aware of exculpatory evidence which bears upon a pos-
sible affirmative defense that, if believed, raises a reasonable doubt about the
defendant's guilt, he should alert the grand jury to its existence and inform them
of their right to call for such evidence.
A.B.A. Grand Jury Policy and Model Act § 101 (1982).
13. 112 S. Ct. 1735 (1992).
14. Id. at 1746.
15. See infra notes 16-25 and accompanying text.
16. See, e.g., United States v. Hawkins, 765 F.2d 1482, 1488 (11th Cir. 1985) (finding
that a prosecutor "is not obligated to present exculpatory evidence to a grand jury"), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 1103 (1986); United States v. Adamo, 742 F.2d 927, 936 (6th Cir. 1984)
(same), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1193 (1985); United States v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 719 F.2d
1386, 1394 (9th Cir. 1983) (same), cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1079 (1984); United States v. Lev-
erage Funding Sys., Inc., 637 F.2d 645, 648 (9th Cir. 1980) (same), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 961
(1981); United States v. Y. Hata & Co., 535 F.2d 508, 512 (9th Cir.) (same), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 828 (1976); United States v. Ruyle, 524 F.2d 1133, 1135-36 (6th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 934 (1976). See also supra note 28 (regarding prosecutorial disclosure rule
in Courts of Appeals for the First and Eighth Circuits). The accused had no right to testify
before the grand jury considering his indictment, and had no right to cross-examine wit-
nesses or introduce evidence in his defense. See United States v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616,
622-23 (2d Cir. 1979); see also MARviN E. FRANKEL & GARY P. NAFTALIS, THE GRAND
JURY: AN INsTrTrUION ON TIAL 30 (1977); Mark E. Cavanagh, Note, Grand Jury: A Pros-
ecutor Need Not Present Exculpatory Evidence, 38 WASH. & LEE L. PEv. 110, 113 (1981);
Note, The Prosecutor's Duty to Present Exculpatory Evidence to an Indicting Grand Jury,
75 MicrH. L. Rnv. 1514, 1516 (1977).
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or innocence is the trial," requiring the prosecutor to present exculpatory
evidence at the pretrial stage s would convert the grand jury proceedings
from a determination of probable cause to a preliminary trial on the mer-
its. 19 In addition, these courts considered the task of identifying what
evidence is exculpatory to be unreasonably difficult.20
Within the past fifteen years, however, the United States Courts
17. See, e.g., Silverthorne v. United States, 400 F.2d 627, 634 (9th Cir. 1968) (stating
that "the greatest safeguard to the liberty of the accused is the petit jury and the rules
governing its determination of a defendant's guilt or innocence").
18. The Supreme Court has recognized that the prosecution's failure to disclose evi-
dence favorable to the defendant upon his request or motion at trial is a violation of due
process. The rule applies where the exculpatory evidence is material to the defendant's
guilt or innocence, regardless of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution. Brady v.
Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (finding defendant's Fourteenth Amendment due process
rights were violated in a State trial for murder where the Government failed to disclose a
statement made by an accomplice in which the accomplice admitted to committing the
homicide).
In United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976), the Court held that the Fifth and Four-
teenth Amendments require the Government to volunteer exculpatory evidence at trial if
such evidence would create a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused. Id. at 112-13.
In Agurs, the Court found that the Government's failure to present defense counsel with
defendant's criminal record did not violate defendant's due process rights, where the de-
fense did not request the evidence and the trial judge remained convinced of defendant's
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt after considering the record in light of the other evidence.
Id. at 114; see also United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 685 (1985) (holding that the
failure to disclose impeachment evidence to the defense violates due process if the evi-
dence would have affected the outcome of the trial); California v. Trombetta 467 U.S. 479,
484 (1984); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154-55 (1972) (finding that the defend-
ant's due process rights were violated where the Government failed to disclose after trial
that it promised not to prosecute a coconspirator if he testified for the Government).
19. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349 (1974); United States v.
Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1973); United States v. Costello, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956).
20. See, e.g., United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 1033, 104142 (D. Md. 1976) (stat-
ing that by requiring a prosecutor to disclose exculpatory evidence to a grand jury "a court
runs the risk of interfering too much with the grand jury process and does so largely on the
basis of guessing what evidence a grand jury might have found persuasive"). But see
United States v. Dorfman, 532 F. Supp. 1118, 1133 (N.D. IIl. 1981) (stating that requiring
the prosecutor to present to a grand jury "evidence which clearly negates the target's
guilt.... [S]hould eliminate most of the problems involved with having to determine what
might be considered exculpatory in the abstract, while still not permitting prosecutors to
undermine completely the grand jury's function as a check on prosecutorial power.").
[Vol. 43:311
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of Appeals for the Second,2  Seventh, 2  and Tenth2 3  Cir-
21. See United States v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616 (2d Cir. 1979). The United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was the first federal court of appeals to recognize
such a duty. In Ciambrone, the defendant sought dismissal of an indictment charging him
with perjury allegedly committed while testifying as a witness in a previous case. Id at 618.
Ciambrone argued that in response to grand juror questioning the prosecutor did not re-
veal that he had been coerced by threats against his life into giving the alleged false testi-
mony. Id. Writing for the majority, Judge Mansfield reasoned that "the prosecutor's right
to exercise some discretion and selectivity in the presentation of evidence to a grand jury
does not entitle him to mislead it or to engage in fundamentally unfair tactics before it."
I& at 623. Thus, the Ciambrone court held that in the "interest of justice," a prosecutor
should present "any substantial evidence negating guilt ... where it might reasonably be
expected to lead the jury not to indict." Id; see also United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d
1141, 1183 (2d Cir. 1989) ("The prosecutor should present exculpatory evidence where
such evidence is 'substantial' and 'where it might reasonably be expected to lead the jury
not to indict."' (quoting Ciambrone, 601 F.2d at 623)), cert denied, 493 U.S. 1081 (1990).
22. See United States v. Flomenhoft, 714 F.2d 708,712 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 465
U.S. 1068 (1984).
In October 1981, Howard C. Flomenhoft was indicted by a federal grand jury for mail
fraud. Id. at 710. Flomenhoft moved the United States District Court for the Northern
District of Indiana to dismiss the indictment because the government failed to disclose to
the grand jury exculpatory evidence in its possession. I& Although the district court de-
nied the defendant's motion, the Government stated that it would seek a superceeding
indictment against Flomenhoft to include two new tax charges and to cure any defects in
the first grand jury proceeding. Id. In its presentation to the grand jury, the Government
revealed the record of the first grand jury proceeding, the alleged exculpatory evidence
excluded from the first grand jury proceeding, and transcripts of testimony from ten wit-
nesses. Id. at 711. When the second grand jury indicted him, Flomenoft challenged the
indictment on the grounds that he was never indicted by an "independent and informed"
grand jury since the Government did not present the alleged exculpatory evidence to the
first grand jury, the second grand jury was composed of individuals who did not serve on
the first grand jury, and the Government failed to call the ten witnesses to testify live
before the second grand jury. Id. Citing the rule enunciated in United States v. Dorfman,
532 F. Supp. 1118, 1133 (N.D. Ill. 1981), that prosecutors "'must present evidence which
clearly negates the target's guilt,'" the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit found the
second indictment to be valid because "all the exculpatory evidence was presented to the
grand jury." Id at 712; see also In re Special Apr. 1977 Grand Jury, 587 F.2d 889, 893 (7th
Cir. 1978) (noting that United States Attorney's manual directs federal prosecutors "to
present to the grand jury 'substantial evidence which directly negates the inference of the
subject's guilt"').
23. In United States v. Page, 808 F.2d 723 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 918 (1987),
Ralph G. Thompson was indicted and convicted in the United States District Court for the
Western District of Oklahoma for racketeering and extortion. He appealed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit on the grounds that the Government did not
present to the grand jury evidence that would have exonerated him. Id. at 726. The Tenth
Circuit stated that the prosecutor "is not obliged to ferret out and present every bit of
potentially exculpatory evidence," id. at 728, but that in the interest of "judicial economy,"
the Government must reveal "substantial exculpatory evidence" if it is "discovered in the
course of an investigation." Id. The court reasoned that "[i]f a fully informed grand jury
cannot find probable cause to indict, there is little chance the prosecution could have
proved guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to a fully informed petit jury." Id. The Page
court, however, did not dismiss the indictment because it found the evidence insufficient to
meet the "clearly exculpatory" standard. Id.; see also United States v. Reid, 911 F.2d
1993)
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cuits,2 4 as well as several federal district courts' and numerous state
1456, 1460 (10th Cir. 1990) (stating that "'although a prosecutor need not present all con-
ceivably exculpatory evidence to the grand jury, it must present evidence that clearly ne-
gates guilt"' (quoting Page, 808 F.2d at 727)), cerL denied, 498 U.S. 1097 (1991).
24. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has not decided the issue
of whether such a duty exists. Several district courts within the Third Circuit have held,
however, that "when a prosecutor is aware of substantial exculpatory evidence, the evi-
dence should be disclosed to the grand jury if it could reasonably cause the grand jury not
to indict." United States v. Cole, 717 F. Supp. 309, 314 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (citing United
States v. Litman, 547 F. Supp. 645, 649 (W.D. Pa. 1982), affd without op. sub nonm. United
States v. Spanjol, 958 F.2d 365 (3d Cir. 1992); see also United States v. Fisher, 692 F. Supp.
495, 504 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (noting that the Third Circuit has not yet determined the duty of
the prosecutor to disclose exculpatory evidence to the grand jury), appeal denied, 871 F.2d
444 (3d Cir. 1989); New Jersey ex rel. Kudisch v. Overbeck, 618 F. Supp. 196, 199 (D.N.J.
1985) (citing conflicting authority regarding the prosecutor's duty to disclose exculpatory
evidence), rev'd on other grounds, 800 F.2d 1139 (3d Cir. 1986).
The First and Eighth Circuits have both held that a "prosecutor is normally not under a
duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to the grand jury," suggesting that extraordinary
circumstances may arise where it would be appropriate to impose such a prosecutorial
obligation. United States v. Wilson, 798 F.2d 509, 517 (1st Cir. 1986); see, e.g., United
States v. Vincent, 901 F.2d 97, 99 (8th Cir. 1990) (stating that a prosecutor is "'normally
not under a duty to disclose exculpatory evidence to the grand jury"' (quoting United
States v. Bucci, 839 F.2d 825, 831 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 844 (1988)); United States
v. Rivera-Santiago, 872 F.2d 1073, 1087 (1st Cir.) (same), cerL denied, 492 U.S. 910 (1989);
United States v. Civella, 666 F.2d 1122, 1127 (8th Cir. 1981) (same).
25. See, e.g., United States v. Short, 777 F. Supp. 40, 42 (D.D.C. 1991) (dismissing an
indictment charging the defendant with possession of cocaine with intent to distribute
where the Government withheld from the grand jury part of codefendant's statement in
which codefendant accepted total responsibility for alleged drug transaction); United
States v. Gressett, 773 F. Supp. 270, 276 (D. Kan. 1991) (stating that a prosecutor must
"reveal known, substantially exculpatory evidence to the grand jury"); United States v.
Law Firm of Zimmerman & Schwartz, P.C., 738 F. Supp. 407, 411 (D. Colo. 1990) (same),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. United States v. Brown, 943 F.2d 1246 (10th Cir. 1991);
United States v. Dyer, 750 F. Supp. 1278, 1300 (E.D. Va. 1990) (stating that "a failure to
present evidence that directly negates a target's guilt constitutes grand jury abuse"); Cole,
717 F. Supp. at 314 (stating that a prosecutor must present "substantial exculpatory evi-
dence ... if it could reasonably cause the grand jury not to indict"); United States v.
Giovanelli, 747 F. Supp. 875, 883 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (stating that the prosecutor "is not re-
quired to highlight every piece of potentially exculpatory evidence... as long as the prose-
cutor does not dupe the grand jury or engage in unfair tactics before it"); United States v.
Recognition Equip., Inc., 711 F. Supp. 1, 12 (D.D.C. 1989) (stating that a prosecutor may
not "hide evidence that clearly negates guilt" from the grand jury); James v. Kelly, 648 F.
Supp. 397, 403 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (same); United States v. Gavran, 620 F. Supp. 1277, 1280
(E.D. Wis. 1985), affd without op., 845 F.2d 1023 (7th Cir. 1988) (same); Kudisch, 618 F.
Supp. at 199 (same); Dorfman, 532 F. Supp. at 1133 (same); United States v. Lawson, 502
F. Supp. 158, 172 (D. Md. 1980) (dismissing an indictment without prejudice where the
prosecutor "intentionally and repeatedly" asked misleading questions and failed "to dis-
close known, exculpatory evidence" to the grand jury); United States v. Linton, 502 F.
Supp. 861, 868 (D. Nev. 1980) (stating that a prosecutor must present to the grand jury
evidence that "clearly negates" guilt); United States v. Gold, 470 F. Supp. 1336, 1353 (N.D.
Ill. 1979) (stating that a prosecutor must present to the grand jury "exculpatory" evidence);
United States v. Olin Corp., 465 F. Supp. 1120, 1127 (W.D.N.Y. 1979) (stating that a prose-
cutor must present to the grand jury evidence which "clearly negates guilt"); United States
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courts,2 6 have required the prosecutor to present exculpatory evidence to
a grand jury. These courts asserted that a prosecutor's concealment of
v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 435 F. Supp. 610, 619-20 (N.D. Okla. 1977) (dismissing on due
process and supervisory power grounds an indictment charging defendants with tax fraud
where the prosecutor examined two witnesses after grand jury was excused for the day and
failed to present exculpatory evidence revealed in those examinations to the grand jury);
United States v. Mandel, 415 F. Supp. 1033,1042 (D. Md. 1976) (stating that a prosecutor
should disclose evidence to grand jury that "clearly would have negated" guilt or where
failure to disclose such evidence "undermined the authority of the grand jury to act");
United States v. DeMarco, 401 F. Supp. 505, 513 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (dismissing an indict-
ment pursuant to supervisory power and on Fifth Amendment due process grounds be-
cause the prosecutor failed to reveal to the grand jury that "the charge could be attacked as
an unjustifiable exercise of the charging power"), affd on other grounds, 550 F.2d 1224
(9th Cir.), cerL denied, 434 U.S. 827 (1977).
26. At least fifteen jurisdictions, either by statute or case law, also require a prosecutor
to present exculpatory evidence to the grand jury. NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 172.145(2)
(Michie 1992) ("If the district attorney is aware of any evidence which will explain away
the charge, he shall submit it to the grand jury."); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-6-11(b) (Michie
1978) ("The prosecuting attorney assisting the grand jury shall present evidence that di-
rectly negates the guilt of the target where he is aware of such evidence."); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22 § 335 (West 1992) ("The grand jurors, upon request of the accused, shall, and
on their own motions may, hear the evidence for the accused."); OR. REv. STAT.
§ 132.320(4) (1991); Nelson v. State, 628 P.2d 884, 887 (Alaska 1981); Frink v. State, 597
P.2d 154, 164 (Alaska 1979) (stating a that prosecutor must "present exculpatory evidence
to the grand jury" because "[t]he grand jury cannot fulfill ... [its protective] function
unless it hears evidence tending to refute, as well as establish, guilt"); State v. Coconino
County Sup. Ct., 678 P.2d 1386, 1389 (Ariz. 1984) (stating that a prosecutor must present
"clearly exculpatory" evidence to the grand jury); Johnson v. Superior Ct., 539 P.2d 792,
796 (Cal. 1975) (stating that the prosecutor must present to the grand jury "evidence rea-
sonably tending to negate guilt"); State v. Couture, 482 A.2d 300,315 (Conn. 1984) (stating
that the prosecutor must present to the grand jury "any substantial evidence that would
negate the accused's guilt"), cerL denied, 469 U.S. 1192 (1985); Miles v. United States, 483
A.2d 649, 655 (D.C. 1984) (same); State v. Adams, 645 P.2d 308, 311 (Haw. 1982) (stating
that the prosecutor must present "clearly exculpatory" evidence to the grand jury); State v.
O'Daniel, 616 P.2d 1383, 1387 (Haw. 1980) (same); State v. Bell, 589 P.2d 517, 521 (1978)
(same); Commonwealth v. Mayfield, 500 N.E.2d 774, 778 (Mass. 1986) (stating that the
prosecutor must disclose to the grand jury "known exculpatory evidence that would greatly
undermine the credibility of an important witness"); Commonwealth v. Connor, 467
N.E.2d 1340,1350 (Mass. 1984) (same); State v. Moore, 438 N.W.2d 101, 105 (Minn. 1989)
(requiring reversal if the prosecutor fails to present exculpatory evidence that "materially
affected the [grand jury] proceeding" (quoting State v. Olkon, 299 N.W.2d 89, 106 (Minn.
1980), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 1132 (1981) (alteration in original))); Ostman v. Eighth Judi-
cial Dist. Ct., 816 P.2d 458, 459-60 (Nev. 1991) (issuing a writ of mandamus ordering dis-
missal of an indictment without prejudice where the prosecutor failed to present
exculpatory evidence to grand jury); Sheriff v. Frank, 734 P.2d 1241, 1244 (Nev. 1987)
(affirming an order dismissing an indictment because the prosecutor did not present excul-
patory evidence to grand jury); Buzbee v. Donnelly, 634 P.2d 1244,1251 (N.M. 1981); Peo-
ple v. Scott, 568 N.Y.S.2d 857 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991); People v. Abbatiello, 494 N.Y.S.2d 625,
627 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1985) (requiring the prosecutor to present exculpatory evidence if it
would "materially influence the grand jury's investigation, or... possibly cause the grand
jury to change its findings"); People v. Monroe, 480 N.Y.S.2d 259,266 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984)
(same); State v. Nordquist, 309 N.W.2d 109, 118 (N.D. 1981); State v. Harwood, 609 P.2d
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exculpatory evidence that is material to the grand jury's determination of
probable cause undermined the grand jury's ability to be "independent
and informed"'27 and to act as a check on prosecutorial power.' More-
over, these courts explained that by withholding such evidence, the prose-
cutor disregarded his constitutional obligation to pursue fairness and
ensure justice is done.29 Finally, the courts noted that a grand jury indict-
ment often has ruinous personal and professional consequences for a de-
fendant that cannot be redressed by a subsequent dismissal or acquittal at
trial.30
1312, 1316 (Or. Ct. App. 1980) (stating that the prosecutor must present evidence to the
grand jury "which objectively refutes the facts as they appear from the state's evidence");
Strehl v. District Ct., 558 P.2d 597, 598-99 (Utah 1976).
27. Gold, 470 F. Supp. at 1353 (stating that a prosecutor "is under legal and ethical
obligations" to disclose exculpatory evidence to the grand jury "since the grand jury cannot
protect citizens from malicious prosecutions if it is not given information which is material
to its determination" of probable cause).
28. See, e.g., Dorfman, 532 F. Supp. at 1131 ("If the prosecutor were to conceal proba-
tive exculpatory evidence, he would effectively subvert the constitutional function of the
grand jury. Its independence and ability to check prosecutorial power would be grossly
undermined.").
29. See, e.g., Dorfman, 532 F. Supp. at 1133 ("Giving prosecutors untrammelled free-
dom to pick and choose which evidence they will present to a grand jury would make a
mockery of their constitutional duty of fairness, and render the grand jury meaningless as a
check on prosecutorial abuse.").
30. United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807, 817 (3d Cir. 1979) (stating that "while in
theory a trial provides the defendant with a full opportunity to contest and disprove the
charges against him, in practice, the handing up of an indictment will often have a devastat-
ing personal and professional impact that a later dismissal or acquittal can never undo").
Monroe H. Freedman has written:
Merely to be charged with a crime is a punishing experience. The defendant's
reputation is immediately damaged, usually irreparably, despite an ultimate fail-
ure to convict. Anguish and anxiety become a daily presence for the defendant,
and for the defendant's family and friends. The emotional strains of the criminal
trial process have been known to destroy marriages and to cause alienation or
emotional disturbance among the accused's children. The financial burden can be
enormous, and may well include loss of employment because of absenteeism due
to pretrial detention or time required away from work during hearings and the
trial, or because of the mere fact of having been named as a criminal defendant.
The trial itself, building up to the terrible anxiety during jury deliberations, is a
torturing experience.
MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 84 (1975); see also
FRANK W. MILLER, PROSECUTION: Ti DECISION TO CHARGE A SUsPECT WITH A CRIME 1
(1969) (highlighting the potential economic and social costs of defending against criminal
charges); Lewis, supra note 8, at 34, 41 (stating that an indictment is "an ordeal whose cost
in terms of money and emotional trauma [can] not [be] cancelled out by a not guilty ver-
dict," and suggesting that "[p]erhaps every prospective grand juror should sit through a
trial, and talk with defendants so that he could come to appreciate the onerous nature of
the impact of an indictment on the accused"); Brice, supra note 7, at 762 ("Whatever the
final outcome of [a defendant's] case may be, indictment can cause the accused loss of
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In United States v. Williams,"1 the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Oklahoma dismissed the indictment of John H. Wtl-
liams, Jr. because the prosecutor failed to disclose substantial exculpatory
evidence to the grand jury that indicted him.32 Williams, an investor who
obtained loans from four Oklahoma banks over the period of one year,
allegedly provided fraudulent financial information on his loan applica-
tions.33 Each time that Williams requested a loan, he presented each
bank with two financial statements.34 On the first statement, Williams
listed as "current assets"35 about six million dollars in notes receivable
from three venture capital companies.3 6 The Government considered
this statement misleading because Williams knew these companies were
newly formed and had a negative net worth.37 On the second statement,
Williams listed the interest payments he received on the notes from the
companies as an outside and independent source of income.38 The Gov-
ernment alleged that the second statement was misleading because Wil-
liams failed to state that these interest payments were made from funds
he had personally loaned to the companies.39
Following a six month investigation, Williams was indicted by a federal
grand jury for seven counts of bank fraud.40 Shortly after arraignment,
Williams moved to compel the Government to reveal any exculpatory
evidence in its possession.41 The Government, in response, disclosed an
edited copy of the grand jury transcript.4" After reviewing the transcript,
Williams moved to dismiss the indictment alleging that the Government
employment, lessening of community respect, and an expensive, time-consuming legal
battle.").
31. 112 S. Ct. 1735 (1992).
32. Id. at 1737.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id. The term "current asset" describes those assets that will be realized as cash
within one year. Id
36. Id.
37. United States v. Williams, 899 F.2d 898, 899 (10th. Cir. 1990), rev'd, 112 S. Ct. 1735
(1992).
38. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1737.
39. Id.
40. Williams was charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 1014 (Supp. I1 1991) by know-
ingly overstating the value of his current assets and interest income "'for the purpose of
influencing in any way the action [of a federally insured financial institution]."' Williams,
112 S. Ct. at 1737 (alterations in original) (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1404).
41. Williams, 899 F.2d at 899. The Government was bound by its Brady obligation.
Id.; see, supra note 18.
42. Id.
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failed to fulfill its duty under United States v. Page4' to disclose exculpa-
tory evidence in its possession to the grand jury.'
The district court initially denied the motion, but on reconsideration, 45
found that the evidence "'raise[d a] reasonable doubt about the defend-
ant's intent to defraud,' because it 'indicate[d] a lawful basis for the infor-
mation provided to the banks.' " Finding the grand jury's decision to
indict to be "'gravely suspect,"' the district court dismissed the indict-
ment without prejudice.4 7
Upon the Government's appeal, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal.' The Tenth Circuit first rec-
ognized the duty of a prosecutor to reveal to a grand jury "substantial
exculpatory evidence" discovered during an investigation.49 The Tenth
Circuit then agreed that intent to perpetrate a crime is a determination
the grand jury must make when deciding whether to indict, and found
that the evidence withheld by the prosecution was relevant to Williams'
intent.5" The Tenth Circuit concluded that the district court's finding that
the Government withheld "substantial exculpatory evidence" from the
grand jury was not "'"clearly erroneous," ' 51 and that the district court's
dismissal of the indictment without prejudice was not an abuse of its
discretion.52
The Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit's decision." Justice
Scalia, writing for a majority of five Justices, 4 indicated that a district
court may not "dismiss an otherwise valid indictment because the Gov-
ernment failed to disclose to the grand jury 'substantial exculpatory evi-
43. 808 F.2d 723, 728 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 918 (1987); see supra note 23.
44. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1737. Williams moved to dismiss the indictment as suspect
because the Government did not present to the grand jury his ledgers, income tax returns,
financial statements, or a deposition he had given in a previous bankruptcy proceeding. Id.
at 1737-38. Williams believed that, because these documents would show that he main-
tained a consistent manner of accounting and that his financial statements to the banks
were not intentionally misleading, the prosecutor should have revealed them to the grand
jury pursuant to Page. Il
45. Williams, 899 F.2d at 899-900.
46. Id. at 900 (quoting Record, vol. 1, Doc. 85, Williams (Nos. 88-2827, 88-2843); Or-
der, Nov. 7, 1988, at 8).
47. Id. (quoting Order, Nov. 7, 1988, at 8-9).
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 904.
51. Id. (quoting United States v. Ortiz, 804 F.2d 1161, 1164 n.2 (10th Cir. 1986) (quot-
ing FED. R. Civ. P. 52(a))).
52. Id.
53. United States v. Williams, 112 S. Ct. 1735, 1737 (1992).
54. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Kennedy and Souter joined the major-
ity opinion. Id.
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dence' in its possession."55 The majority determined that this disclosure
rule is not justified as an exercise of the court's supervisory power.56 The
Court reasoned that because the grand jury is an institution separate from
the judicial branch, the judiciary's inherent power to control grand jury
procedure is restricted.57 The majority also found that the disclosure rule
could not be supported by the "'common law"' of the Fifth Amendment
Grand Jury Clause." The Court opined that if the judiciary set standards
of conduct for prosecutors before the grand jury, rather than facilitate the
grand jury's ability to be "independent and informed,"59 it would drasti-
cally change the historical role of the grand jury from an accusatory body
deciding probable cause to an adjudicatory body determining guilt or
innocence.6°
In a dissenting opinion,61 Justice Stevens found that federal courts do
have the inherent supervisory power to impose a disclosure rule, but have
simply declined to exercise such power.62 Justice Stevens supported
greater judicial control of grand jury proceedings because a prosecutor is
more apt to use unfair tactics before a grand jury due to the ex parte
nature of the proceedings and the absence of a presiding judge.63 The
dissent emphasized that the grand jury is not an "autonomous body";
rather, it is subject to the control of the court during all stages of its life.64
Justice Stevens concluded that compelling a prosecutor to present excul-
patory evidence would not alter the historical role of the grand jury, but
instead would preserve the protective function of the grand jury by ensur-
ing that it returns "independent" and "informed" decisions.
65
55. Id at 1737. The majority first resolved the procedural question of whether the
disclosure rule issue was properly before the Court. Id. at 1738. Finding that the petition
for certiorari was properly granted, the Court stated:
It is a permissible exercise of our discretion to undertake review of an important
issue expressly decided by a federal court where, although the petitioner did not
contest the issue in the case immediately at hand, it did so as a party to a recent
proceeding upon which the lower courts relied for their resolution of the issue,
and did not concede in the current case the correctness of that precedent.
Id. at 1740-41 (footnote omitted).
56. Id. at 1742.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1744.
59. Id (quoting Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962)).
60. Id.
61. Justices Blackmun, O'Connor, and Thomas joined the dissent. Id. at 1737. Justice
Thomas did not join the dissent on the issue of whether certiorari was improvidently
granted. Id.
62. Id. at 1752.
63. Id. at 1750.
64. Id. at 1752.
65. Id. at 1753.
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This Note first traces the historical development of the grand jury in
England and America. It then examines the dual role of prosecutors, and
their increasingly powerful influence over the grand jury. This Note then
investigates the purpose and breadth of the courts' supervisory power
over the grand jury. Next, this Note analyzes the Supreme Court's deci-
sion in United States v. Williams and its impact on the judiciary's exercise
of supervisory power over the grand jury. This Note concludes that the
Supreme Court has properly restricted the federal courts from encroach-
ing upon the grand jury's autonomy and has wisely left to the discretion
of Congress whether to curb perceived grand jury abuses by imposing a
prosecutorial disclosure rule.
I. HisroRY OF THE GRAN'D JURY
A. Originating in English Law
In England, the initiation of criminal charges was historically a private
concern.66 The victim of a crime, or a surviving relative of the deceased
victim, prosecuted his case in a local court, which was typically dominated
by a nobleman or landowner. 7 Once accused, the suspect could establish
his innocence either by recruiting eleven persons who would attest under
oath to his blamelessness, or by undergoing trial by ordeal or battle.
6 8
In 1166 the Crown became actively involved in the prosecution of
criminals when King Henry II created the Assize of Clarendon.69 The
66. RALPH A. FINE, ESCAPE OF Tm GuILTY 8 (1986). The private prosecution of
crimes was abolished in England in 1819. Id. at 10.
67. Id. at 9.
68. See Helene E. Schwartz, Demythologizing the Historic Role of the Grand Jury, 10
AM. CRIM. L. Rlv. 701, 707 (1972).
A trial by ordeal, abolished in England in 1215 by the Lateran Council, was conducted in
one of four ways. The first required the suspect to hold a piece of burning iron in his hand
and walk nine steps without dropping it. The second required the suspect to submerge his
hands in a pot of boiling water, the healing of the burns being a divine sign of innocence.
The third required the suspect to be thrown into cold water, his innocence manifest if the
"pure water accepted him," that is, if he sank. Lastly, the suspect would be found not
guilty if he could swallow a piece of bread or cheese without choking to death. FINE, supra
note 66, at 7-9; see also FRANKEL & NAFrALIS, supra note 15, at 9; THEODORE F.T.
PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 113-15 (5th ed. 1956) (explaining
the ordeals).
A trial by battle was brought to England by the Norman conquerors, and required a
physical fight between the victim and the suspect. If the suspect won, it was considered a
divine indication of his guiltlessness. FINE, supra note 66, at 7-9.
69. Although the Assize is often credited as being the English progenitor of the Amer-
ican grand jury system, some historians cite the Constitutions of Clarendon, as establishing
the grand jury. Michael E. Deutsch, The Improper Use of the Federal Grand Jury: An
Instrument for the Internment of Political Activists, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1159,
1163 (1984); Lewis, supra note 8, at 36 n.11; Schwartz, supra note 68, at 707. In 1164,
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Assize established a procedure whereby twelve men were selected in
each township to serve on local grand juries.70 The grand jurors, rather
than the victim of the crime, were responsible for publicly charging an
accused with criminal activity.71 Unlike modem grand jurors, the grand
jurors under the Assize system were not required to review evidence and
carefully determine the existence of probable cause.72 Instead, the grand
Thomas Becket reluctantly signed the Constitutions of Clarendon on behalf of the Church,
thereby conceding some of the judicial jurisdiction of the ecclesiastical courts to the
Crown. Lewis, supra, at 36 n.11; Schwartz, supra, at 705. Chapter 6 of the Constitutions
prohibited the bishop from charging a layman with a crime unless the bishop identified an
accuser who would make his charges publicly, or allowed the sheriff to select twelve men to
listen to the evidence against the accused and then submit the charges to the ecclesiastical
courts. Id at 706; see also LEROY D. CLARK, THE GRAND JURY: THE USE AND ABUSE OF
POLMCAL POWER 8 (1975).
Chapter 6 of the Constitutions of Clarendon provided that:
Laymen are not to be accused save by proper and legal accusers and witnesses in
the presence of the bishop, so that the archdeacon do not [sic] lose his right nor
anything due to him thence. And if the accused be such that no one wills or dares
to accuse them, the sheriff, when requested by the bishop, shall cause twelve law-
ful men from the neighborhood or the town to swear before the bishop that they
will show the truth in the matter according to their conscience.
Assim. OF CLARENDON, CH. 1, reprinted in GEORGE B. ADAMS & H. MORSE STEPHENS,
SELECr DocumENTs OF ENGLISH CONSTrTUTIONAL HIsTORY 11, 11 (1926). While some
historians posit that the grand jury is really of Frankish, Scandinavian, or Roman origin,
most agree that the American federal grand jury was modeled on the grand jury of English
common law. See FRANKEL & NAFTAUS, supra note 15, at 6-9; PLUCKNETr, supra note 68,
at 107-10; 1 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MArrLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH
LAW 151-52 (2d ed. 1968); Maurice S. Glaser, The Political and Historical Development of
the Grand Jury, 8 LAW Soc'Y J. 192, 192 (1938); Lewis, supra note 8, at 36 n.12, 37-38;
Wayne L. Morse, A Survey of the Grand Jury System (Part I), 10 OR. L. Rv. 101, 102-18
(1931); Schwartz, supra at 703, 707.
70. Chapter I of the Assize of Clarendon provides that:
In the first place, the aforesaid King Henry, with the consent of all his barons,
for the preservation of the peace and the keeping of justice, has enacted that
inquiry should be made through the several counties and through the several hun-
dreds, by twelve of the most legal men of the hundred and by four of the most
legal men of each vill, upon their oath that they will tell the truth, whether there is
in their hundred or in their vill, any man who has been accused or publicly sus-
pected of himself being a robber, or murderer, or thief, or of being a receiver of
robbers, or murderers or thieves, since the lord King has been King. And let
justices make this inquiry before themselves, and the sheriffs before themselves.
AssizE OF CLARENDON, CH. 1, reprinted in ADAMs & STEPHENS, supra note 69, at 14-15.
71. Schwartz, supra note 68, at 708. A charge by the Assize of alleged criminal wrong-
doing was tantamount to a determination of guilt, and the suspect was usually required to
undergo the ordeal by water, a procedure which almost always resulted in drowning. Id;
see supra note 68.
72. See SARA S. BEA E & WILIAM C. BRYSON, GRAND JURY LAW & PRACTICE
§ 1:02, at 5 (1986); Ron S. Chun, The Right to Grand Jury Indictment, 26 Am. CRnr. L.
REv. 1457, 1459 (1989).
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jurors were expected to identify from personal knowledge and under oath
those persons suspected of having perpetrated crimes.
73
Rather than safeguard individual rights, King Henry II's purpose in
creating the Assize was to aggrandize the Crown's power at the expense
of the ecclesiastical74 and baronial courts.75 The Assize functioned to
centralize the administration of justice under the Crown and to generate
revenues for the royal treasury.76 Essentially, the Assize acted as an ad-
ministrative agency to execute the King's laws and political ends.
77
By 1215, the Magna Carta mandated both presentment and trial by
ordeal.78 This provision was subsequently codified in a statute which stip-
ulated that the government could not charge an individual with treason or
other capital crimes absent an indictment or presentment by a grand
jury.79 This statutory language was later used in American colonial char-
ters, state constitutions, and ultimately the United States Constitution. 0
73. PLucKNETr, supra note 68, at 112-13.
74. FRANKEL & NAFrALIS, supra note 16, at 6-7. King Henry II recognized that the
ecclesiastical courts were eroding the historical absolutism of the English monarchy in sev-
eral ways. First, the twelfth century witnessed the height of church power and the corre-
sponding development of ecclesiastical law, which threatened the secular English common
law. Second, the ecclesiastical courts had absolute jurisdiction for all civil and criminal
cases involving clerics, as well as lay cases involving the law of marriage, wills, and the
inheritance of property, thereby reducing the King's judicial control over all Britons. Id. at
704-05. Third, the church amassed wealth from the fines imposed by its courts. CLARK,
supra note 69, at 8.
75. See generally FRANKEL & NAFrALIS, supra note 16, at 6-7; Douglas P. Currier,
Note, The Exercise of Supervisory Powers to Dismiss a Grand Jury Indictment-A Basis for
Curbing Prosecutorial Misconduct, 45 Onjo ST. LJ. 1077, 1078 (1984); see also Deutsch,
supra note 69, at 1163.
76. Lewis, supra note 8, at 36. When a suspect was arrested under the authority of the
Assize, the baronial courts were deprived of jurisdiction over that individual. The King,
therefore, and not the barons, was entitled to seize the suspect's property.
The King would also generate revenue by imposing heavy fines on the grand jurors if
they did not appear for service when summoned, did not indict an individual suspected of
crime, or failed to present an acceptable number of criminals. These funds were used
primarily for the purpose of paying mercenaries to defend the kingdom. In King v.
Windham, 84 Eng. Rep. 113 (K.B. 1667), the English court made it illegal to fine grand
jurors for failing to indict. Schwartz, supra note 68, at 709 n.41.
77. Currier, supra note 75, at 1078. In addition to determining whether a case would
go to trial, grand jurors had other responsibilities. Grand jurors were sometimes called
upon by the judge to render advice on punishments and pardons. The grand jury also
acted as voice for the community, investigating and reporting on problems of social con-
cern, like improperly maintained prisons and bridges. See J.M. BEATE, CRIME AND THE
CoURrs iN ENor.LAr 1660-1800, at 319-20 (1986); Barry J. Stern, Revealing Misconduct by
Public Officials Through Grand Jury Reports, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 73, 84 (1987) (discussing
the grand jury's reporting function).
78. Chun, supra note 72, at 1459.
79. Id. at 1460.
80. Id.
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During the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, indictment or presentment
by grand jury became the leading methods of criminal accusation in
England."'
The seventeenth century witnessed the evolution of the grand jury into
a role as "a protector of the citizenry against arbitrary prosecution. '' 82 In
1681, King Charles II sought to separately indict Stephen Colledge and
Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl of Shaftesbury, for treason.83 Both
men were Protestants who vigorously opposed the King's efforts to rees-
tablish the Roman Catholic Church in England.' 4 In each case, the
grand jury members rejected the King's attempts to influence their deci-
sion and refused to indict. 5 Thus, the grand jury assumed the func-
81. Id. When a grand jury accused an individual on its own initiative, the charging
document was called a presentment. The grand jury eventually stopped relying solely on
the knowledge of its jurors to identify suspected criminals. When royal authorities in-
formed the grand jury of suspected criminals and submitted evidence for its consideration,
the charging document was called an indictment. If the grand jury determined there was
adequate evidence to bring the accused to trial, it returned a "true bill." If, however, the
grand jury found the evidence inadequate to justify a trial, it marked the indictment "no
bill" or "not a true bill." See Acker, supra note 2, at 44; see also supra note 2 and accom-
panying text.
82. Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 789 (D.C.Cir. 1973) (Wdkey, J., dissenting); see also
FRANKEL & NAFrAus, supra note 16, at 9; Chun, supra note 72, at 1460-61.
By the seventeenth century, the grand jury no longer played such a central role in the
English system of government for two reasons. First, as petit juries began to supplant trials
by ordeal, and as the distinction between grand juries and petit juries became clear, a
grand jury indictment was no longer considered tantamount to a determination of guilt.
Second, as the parliamentary system became more established and could exercise its power
to tax, the Crown no longer relied upon the grand jury as a primary source of revenue.
CLAm, supra note 69, at 9; Schwartz, supra note 68, at 710-11. The struggle for power was
now between the King and Parliament, not the grand jury. Schwartz, supra, at 711.
83. Currier, supra note 75, at 1078.
84. Id.
85. Lewis, supra note 8, at 37. Upon learning that James, the brother of Charles Il and
also a Roman Catholic, might ascend to the throne, Lord Shaftesbury submitted a bill of
indictment to the grand jury alleging that James had broken the laws mandating recogni-
tion of the Anglican Church. The King instructed the court to dismiss the grand jurors
before they could consider the bill, and in retaliation, presented a bill to a grand jury in
London which alleged that Stephen Colledge, a follower of Shaftesbury, had made treason-
ous statements and was planning to overthrow the King. The grand jury did not indict. See
CIAruc, supra note 69, at 9-10; Schwartz, supra note 68, at 712-14.
In response, King Charles II sought the indictment of Shaftesbury for treason. On No-
vember 24, 1681, Chief Judge Pemberton instructed the grand jury:
"And let me tell you, if any of you shall be refractory, and will not find any bill,
where there is a probable ground for an accusation, you do therein undertake to
intercept justice: and you thereby make yourselves criminals and guilty, and the
fault will lie at your door."
United States v. Asdrubal-Herrera, 470 F. Supp. 939, 942 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (quoting 8 How.
St. ft. 770 (1681)). Despite the biased charge, the grand jury refused to indict. Schwartz,
supra, at 716-18.
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tion of protecting citizens against the oppressive exercise of executive
power.
86
B. Developing in America
The English colonists in the New World modeled their legal institutions
on those of England, and each colony incorporated the grand jury into its
judicial system.' Like their English counterparts, colonial grand jurors
presented suspected criminals and protected innocents from wrongful
prosecution."m They planned the scope and direction of their investiga-
tions and gathered their own evidence.8 9 In addition to serving as an ac-
cusatory panel, the colonial grand jury assumed many additional roles
that their English counterparts did not play. Becoming an essential part
of local government, the colonial grand jury represented the people in its
community, suggested new laws, exposed governmental abuses, identified
municipal problems such as roads and bridges in need of repair, and per-
formed administrative duties.90
During the American Revolution, colonists perceived the grand jury as
a weapon to oppose British authority and to further the goals of the
Revolution.9' By returning "no bills" in response to presentments made
by British officials,92 colonial grand juries could frustrate the enforcement
86. Currier, supra note 75, at 1078; Glaser, supra note 69, at 203; Lewis, supra note 8,
at 37-38. The assertion that these two cases represent specifically when and how the grand
jury assumed its protective function is somewhat problematic because of what later hap-
pened to Colledge and Shaftesbury. Colledge was indicted upon the presentment of less
evidence by a grand jury sitting in Oxford. While the London grand jury was composed of
Protestants selected by Protestant sheriffs, the Oxford grand jurors were more sympathetic
to the King. Colledge was then tried by a petit jury, convicted, and executed. Fearing that
he would be indicted by a second grand jury composed of members loyal to the King,
Shaftesbury fled to Holland and died in exile in 1683. See CLARK, supra note 69, at 11-12;
FRANKEL & NAFrALIS, supra note 16, at 10; Bruce H. Schneider, The Grand Jury: Powers,
Procedures, and Problems, 9 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 681, 682-83 n.9 (1973); Schwartz,
supra note 68, at 719-20.
87. BEALE & BRYSON, supra note 72, § 1:03, at 12-16; Acker, supra note 1, at 46.
88. BEALE & BRYsoN, supra note 72, § 1:03, at 12-16; YOUNGER, supra note 9, at 26.
89. Because England did not have an organized police force until 1824 or a public
prosecutor system until 1879, English grand jurors conducted their own investigations.
Whyte, supra note 9, at 482-83.
90. YOUNGER, supra note 9, at 5-20, 26.
91. Id. at 27; see FRANKEL & NAFTALis, supra note 16, at 12 (stating that grand juries
during the American Revolution "functioned as both patriotic organs and propaganda
agencies, adopting resolutions condemning Great Britain and urging the people to support
the struggle for freedom").
92. YOUNGER, supra note 9, at 37 ("Since the early days of the struggle against Eng-
land, Revolutionary leaders had effectively labeled the information of a prosecutor as an
odious instrument of British tyranny, while at the same time they had hailed indictment by
a grand jury as one of their rights as Englishmen.").
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of unpopular English laws and protect colonists who flouted British au-
thority.93 One famous example involved publisher John Peter Zenger
who published newspaper articles in the New York Weekly Journal alleg-
edly libeling Governor Cosby and angering British officials.94 Despite
strong admonishments by Chief Justice Delancey of the New York
Supreme Court, a friend of Governor Cosby, two grand juries in New
York refused to indict Zenger.95 During the Revolution, the grand jury
continued to address local concerns and served to smooth the transition
from royal to state government.96
When the United States Constitution was submitted to the states for
ratification, it contained no grand jury provision. 7 During the state rati-
fying conventions, some representatives persuasively argued to amend
the federal constitution to require that federal prosecutions be initiated
by grand jury presentment or indictment. 98 In light of these arguments,
93. Id. at 27. In many instances, the grand juries were blatantly partisan and refused
to indict not because the evidence was insufficient, but because they condoned the con-
duct. Grand jurors, for instance, returned a "no bill" where royal officials sought to indict
the leaders of the Stamp Act Rebellion in 1765. BEALE & BRYSON, supra note 72, § 1:03,
at 15; YOUNGER, supra, at 28; Acker, supra note 1, at 46 n.79. Grand jurors also refused to
indict the editors of the Boston Gazette for libeling Governor Francis Bernard in 1768,
despite Chief Justice Thomas Hutchinson's charge to the grand jurors that they would be
"'damned if they did not find a true bill."' YOUNGER, supra, at 28 (quoting letter to Chief
Justice Oliver, BOSroN GAzmTE, Mar. 31, 1777); see also FRANKEL & NArALis, supra
note 16, at 11.
94. See 1 PELEG W. CHANDLER, AmE-RICAN CRIMINAL TRIALS 153-55 (1970); Acker,
supra note 1, at 46.
95. FRANKEL & NAFrALIS, supra note 16, at 11; Note, The Grand Jury as an Investiga-
tory Body, 74 HArv. L. REv. 590,590-91 (1961). Zenger was later charged by information,
arrested, and acquitted at trial. See BEALE & BRYSON, supra note 72, § 1:03 at 15; 1 CHAN-
DLER, supra note 93, at 155-206; FRA.NKEL & NAFrALIS, supra note 15, at 11; HELEN H.
MIUt.ER,.THE CASE FOR LIBERTY 31-33 (1965); TiH TRIAL OF PETER ZENaER 35, 93-132
(Vincent Buranelli ed., Greenwood Press 1975) (1957); Acker, supra note 1, at 46 n.79;
Schwartz, supra note 68, at 723 n.105.
96. YOUNGER, supra note 9, at 36-37. Grand juries suggested price controls for essen-
tial goods, ensured that officials and local agencies performed their duties, inspected town
records, and determined tax rates. Id
97. BEALE & BRYSON, supra note 72, § 1:04, at 18-19; YOUNGER, supra note 9, at 44-
45; Acker, supra note 1, at 46.
98. During the Massachusetts ratifying convention, Abraham Holmes commented that
there is no provision made in the Constitution to prevent the attorney-general
from filing information against any person, whether he is indicted by the grand
jury or not; in consequence of which the most innocent person in the common-
wealth may be taken by virtue of a warrant issued in consequence of such infor-
mation, and dragged from his home, his friends, his acquaintance, and confined in
prison, until the next session of the court ... and after long, tedious, and painful
imprisonment, though acquitted on trial, may have no possibility to obtain any
kind of satisfaction for the loss of his liberty, the loss of his time, great expenses,
and perhaps cruel sufferings.
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the Massachusetts convention, later followed by the New York and New
Hampshire conventions, recommended that Congress amend the Consti-
tution to include such a provision.99 James Madison received eight such
proposals from the states, and on June 8, 1789, he proposed to the first
Congress an amendment ensuring the right to a grand jury indictment for
all infamous or capital crimes." Madison's proposal was rephrased,
passed by the House and Senate, and ratified on December 15, 1791 as
the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.' 0 '
The Framers of the Constitution intended the federal grand jury, like
its English forerunner, to act as both a "sword and a shield."'" As a
sword, the grand jury has extraordinary power to carry out its investiga-
tory function, and acts free of procedural or evidentiary rules.10 3 For ex-
ample, the grand jury has at its disposal broad subpoena,"° immunity,
05
and contempt powers.10 6 Although these powers are exercised under the
court's supervision and are not unlimited,"° the grand jury may use them
2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FED-
ERAL CONSTIrruIoN 110 (Jonathan Ellito ed., 2d ed. 1901); see also BEALE & BRYSON,
supra note 72, § 1:04, at 19; YOUNGER, supra note 9, at 45; Acker, supra note 1, at 46 n.84.
99. Speaking for the Massachusetts convention, John Hancock proposed nine amend-
ments to the Constitution. The sixth proposed amendment provided for the right to indict-
ment by a grand jury for infamous or capital crimes. BEALE & BRYSON, supra note 72,
§ 1:04, at 19; see 2 GEORGE T. CURTIS, HISTORY OF THE ORIGIN, FORmATION, AND ADOP-
TION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 537, 540 (1858); YOUNGER, supra
note 9, at 45; Acker, supra note 1, at 47 n.85.
100. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE GREAT RIGHTS OF MANKIND: A HISTORY OF THm
AMERucAN BILL OF RIrrs 163-65 (1977). James Madison's proposed amendment re-
quired that "in all crimes punishable with loss of life or member, presentment or indict-
ment by a grand jury shall be an essential preliminary." Id. at 233; see also BEALE &
BRYSON, supra note 72, § 1:04, at 19; Acker, supra note 1, at 48.
101. BEALE & BRYSON, supra note 72, § 1:04 at 19; YOUNGER, supra note 9, at 46;
Acker, supra note 1, at 49; Chun, supra note 72, at 1466-67.
102. United States v. Cox, 342 F.2d 167, 186 n.1 (5th Cir.) (Wisdom, J., concurring)
("The Grand Jury is both a sword and a shield of justice-a sword because it is the terror
of criminals, a shield because it is the protection of the innocent against unjust prosecu-
tion." (quoting FEDERAL GRAND JURY HANDBOOK 8 (1959)), cert denied, 381 U.S. 935
(1965).
103. See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349 (1974) ("Because the grand
jury does not finally adjudicate guilt or innocence, it has traditionally been allowed to
pursue its investigative and accusatorial functions unimpeded by the evidentiary and pro-
cedural restrictions applicable to a criminal trial."); see also FED. R. Evm. 1101(d) (stating
that "[t]he rules [of evidence] do not apply [to] ... [p]roceedings before grand juries").
104. FED. R. CRiM. P. 17(a); see infra note 107.
105. 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002, 6003 (1988).
106. FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(g).
107. The grand jury depends on the court to execute its subpoena power. Calandra,
414 U.S. at 346 n.4 (stating that the grand jury may ask the court "to compel production of
books, papers, documents, and the testimony of witnesses"). The court, however, may
limit the grand jury's subpoena power in certain circumstances. AL at 346 (stating that
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to obtain "'every man's evidence.' "108 As a shield, the grand jury is
designed "to provide a fair method for instituting criminal proceed-
ings." 1 9 The grand jury, after deliberating in secret, 110 allows the gov-
ernment to prosecute only those persons for whom it has probable cause
to believe have committed a crime.11' The prosecutor plays an indispen-
sable role in helping the grand jury make its determination of probable
cause.
grand jury subpoena power is "not unlimited"). The court, for instance, may quash or
modify a subpoena on motion if it is overly broad, or "if compliance would be 'unreasona-
ble or oppressive."' Id. at 346 n.4 (citing FED. R. CPsM. P. 17(c)); see, e.g., United States v.
Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 573 (1976) (holding that the Fourth Amendment requires a
grand jury to show that its subpoena for documents is reasonably related to its investiga-
tion); Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 708 (1972) ("Grand juries are subject to judicial
control and subpoenas to motions to quash."); In re Grand Jury Subpoena: Subpoena Du-
ces Tecum (Model Magazine), 829 F.2d 1291, 1302 (4th Cir. 1987) (quashing grand jury
subpoena duces tecum because of vagueness and over-intrusiveness); In re Horowitz, 482
F.2d 72, 75-80 (2d Cir.) (tracing the development of the overbreadth doctrine for grand
jury subpoenae duces tecum), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 867 (1973). A grand jury, moreover,
may not use its subpoena power to infringe upon a constitutional, statutory, or common
law privilege. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 346. For example, a grand jury witness can not be
forced to respond to questions that would violate his Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination, unless the witness is granted immunity. Id (citing Kastigar v. United
States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972)).
108. Branburg, 408 U.S. at 688 (quoting United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331
(1950)); see also Calandra, 414 U.S. at 344 ("A grand jury investigation 'is not fully carried
out until every available clue has been run down and all witnesses examined in every
proper way to find if a crime has been committed."' (quoting United States v. Stone, 429
F.2d 138, 140 (2d Cir. 1970))).
109. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362 (1956).
110. In United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677 (1958), the Supreme
Court explained that the grand jury deliberates in secret in order
"(1) To prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be contemplated; (2)
to insure the utmost freedom to the grand jury in its deliberations, and to prevent
persons subject to indictment or their friends from importuning the grand jurors;
(3) to prevent subornation of perjury or tampering with the witnesses who may
testify before grand jury and later appear at the trial of those indicted by it; (4) to
encourage free and untrammeled disclosures by persons who have information
with respect to the commission of crimes; (5) to protect innocent accused who is
exonerated from disclosure of the fact that he has been under investigation, and
from the expense of standing trial where there was no probability of guilt."
Id. at 681-82 n.6 (quoting United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 628-29 (3d Cir. 1954)); see
also FRANKEL & NAvrALIS, supra note 16, at 23-24.
111. See Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962). A federal grand jury is composed
of "not less than 16 nor more than 23 members," of whom 12 must concur to return an
indictment. FED. R. CRiM. P. 6(a), (f); see FRANKEL & NAFrAus, supra note 16, at 18. In
determining probable cause, the grand jury has "the power to charge a greater offense or a
lesser offense; numerous counts or a single count; and ... a capital offense or a noncapital
offense." Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 263 (1986). The grand jury, moreover, "'is not
bound to indict in every case where a conviction can be obtained."' Id (quoting United
States v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616, 629 (2d Cir. 1979) (Friendly, J., dissenting)).
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II. ROLE OF THE PROSECUTOR
A. Acting as Advocate and Advisor
When a United States Attorney comes before the grand jury, he per-
forms the dual role of "pressing for an indictment and of being the grand
jury's advisor., 112 As an advocate seeking an indictment, he must "pros-
ecute with earnestness and vigor.' 113  A prosecutor, however, does not
represent an "ordinary party to a controversy" whose goal is always to
win its case." 4 Rather, the prosecutor is an agent of the United States
government, whose obligation is to execute the laws in an impartial and
just manner.115 Thus, the prosecutor must assist, but not direct, the grand
jury in making its determination of probable cause.1
1 6
B. Growing Power and Influence
A United States Attorney possesses enormous power over the grand
jury by virtue of the multiple duties he performs. 1 7 The prosecutor re-
quests that a grand jury be impaneled"' and then directs the grand jury
112. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d at 628 (Friendly, J., dissenting) (citing United States v. Rem-
ington, 208 F.2d 567, 573-73 (2d Cir. 1953) (Hand, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 913
(1954)).
113. See Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935), overruled on other grounds by
Stirone v. United States, 361 U.S. 212 (1960).
114. Id. In Berger, Justice Sutherland concluded:
The United States Attorney is the representative not of an ordinary party to a
controversy, but of a sovereignty whose obligation (is] to govern impartially...
and whose interest.., in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but
that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the
servant of the law, the twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or inno-
cence suffer.
Id.
115. Id.; see also United States v. Dorfman, 532 F. Supp. 1118,1132 (N.D. IU. 1981) ("A
prosecutor is not simply another advocate. He is the attorney of the people, and as such,
has an independent duty to seek justice even when it may hurt his case." (citing MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrTY EC 7-13 (1980))).
116. See Currier, supra note 75, at 1079; see also Ciambrone, 601 F.2d at 628 (Friendly,
J., dissenting) (stating that in a case where a prosecutor's role as an advocate conflicts with
his responsibility to be a grand jury's impartial advisor, "the latter duty must take
precedence").
117. 8 JAMEs W. MOORE, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRAC1ICE % 6.04[1] (2d ed. 1988) (stating
that "[t]he prosecutor is in control of grand jury proceedings"); Schneider, supra note 86,
at 699 ("As the lone professional in a judicial proceeding otherwise conducted by laymen
and as a high government official, the prosecutor has great influence with the grand jury
throughout its hearings.").
118. A United States Attorney brings cases before a grand jury for two purposes: in-
dictment and investigation. 8 MOORE, supra note 117, 6.04[1], at 6-94. Those cases sub-
mitted for indictment often "involve simple fact situations and may be presented in a
matter of minutes." Id. These cases may include matters originally submitted for investi-
gation for which the prosecutor later requests an indictment. Id. Cases submitted for in-
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proceedings.11 9 The prosecutor gathers and presents evidence; selects
and examines witnesses;12 ° informs the jurors of the offenses charged and
educates the jurors on the law;1 21 and requests and almost always drafts
an indictment.122 The United States Attorney is permitted to always be
present in the grand jury room during the investigative portion of the
proceedings, 123 and represents the grand jury at hearings before the fed-
eral judiciary.
124
In submitting a case to a grand jury, a prosecutor exercises wide discre-
tion.1" But because he must act in "good faith," '126 the prosecutor may
not mislead the grand jury "or... engage in fundamentally unfair tactics
before it." 27 It is improper, for instance, for the prosecutor to secure an
vestigation usually begin with the identification of some primary suspects, but further
factual discovery is necessary to determine the extent of the criminal activity and the iden-
tity of other possible suspects. Id. at 6-94 to -95. When the prosecutor uses a grand jury
for investigative purposes, the prosecutor "has presumably not yet formed an opinion as to
the prosecution," and can "[i]n one sense ... engage in a fishing expedition without violat-
ing any principle of law or ethics." I&
119. See BENNETr L. GERSHmAN, PROSECtrroRIAL MIscoNDUcr § 2.01, at 2-2 (1993)
(stating that "[e]veryone familiar with grand jury practice recognizes that the prosecutor
runs the show"); Antell, supra note 8, at 155 ("The so-called grand jury 'investigation' ...
is really nothing more than a review of the prosecutor's predigested evidence and a ratifi-
cation of his conclusions."). Grand jury proceedings are shrouded in secrecy; only the
grand jurors, prosecutor, witnesses, stenographer, operator or recording device and inter-
preter, if necessary, may attend. FED. R. CRiM. P. 6(d).
120. United States v. Remington, 208 F.2d 567, 573 (2d Cir. 1953) (L. Hand, J., dissent-
ing) (stating that "[s]ave for torture, it would be hard to find a more effective tool of
tyranny than the power of unlimited and unchecked ex parte examination"), cert. denied,
347 U.S. 913 (1954).
121. See Currier, supra note 75, at 1079.
122. 1L.; United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1312 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
825 (1977).
123. While evidence is being presented by the prosecutor, no judge is present to over-
see the proceedings and no attorney is present to protect the limited rights of the defend-
ant or grand jury witnesses. Chanen, 549 F.2d at 1312.
The prosecutor, however, may not enter the grand jury room during grand jury delibera-
tions or voting. See Currier, supra note 75, at 1080; Michael K. Williams, Note, Grand
Jury: Bulwark of Prosecutorial Immunity, 3 Loy. U. CI. LJ. 305, 310 (1972).
124. Sullivan & Nachman, supra note 8, at 1050.
125. See United States v. Gold, 470 F. Supp. 1336, 1353 (N.D. 111. 1979).
126. United States v. Basurto, 497 F.2d 781, 786 (9th Cir. 1974) (stating that the prose-
cutor must exercise "good faith ... with respect to the court, the grand jury and the
defendant").
127. United States v. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d 616, 623 (2d Cir. 1979); see also Berger v.
United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935) (stating that while a prosecutor "may strike hard
blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from im-
proper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate
means to bring about a just one."), overruled on other grounds by Stirone v. United States,
361 U.S. 212 (1960).
1993]
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indictment on the basis of evidence he knows is perjurious,' or to lead
the grand jury to think "it has received eyewitness rather than hearsay
testimony.'
129
Over time, grand jurors have become more dependent upon the prose-
cutor in several ways.130 First, unlike early English and colonial grand
jurors who identified suspected criminals from personal knowledge,
modem grand jurors generally lack any personal knowledge of criminal
activities and must wait for the prosecutor to bring cases to them.131 Sec-
ond, while early English and colonial grand juries gathered their own evi-
dence, modem grand juries evaluate evidence as it is collected by
governmental agencies and revealed to them at the discretion of the pros-
ecutor.132 Thus, although modem grand juries may request additional ev-
idence and question witnesses directly, 33 they are restricted to
conducting investigations from within the four walls of the grand jury
room.134 Third, English and colonial grand jurors could easily under-
stand the common law crimes of murder, robbery, rape and arson, of-
fenses for which they usually indicted defendants. 135  Modem grand
jurors, however, are confronted with a plethora of complex federal statu-
tory crimes. Usually lacking any legal training, 36 modem grand jurors
128. Ciambrone, 601 F.2d at 623.
129. Id. (citing United States v. Estepa, 471 F.2d 1132, 1136-37 (2d Cir. 1972)).
130. See id. at 622 (stating that the grand jury "must lean heavily upon the United
States Attorney as its investigator and legal advisor to present to it such evidence as it
needs for its performance of its function and to furnish it with controlling legal princi-
ples"); Recent Case, 104 U. PA. L. Rv. 429, 431 (1955) ("Although the grand jury was
originally conceived to inquire after offenses and bring charges, its investigative and accu-
satory functions have been largely supplanted by the development of the public prosecu-
tor." (footnote omitted)).
131. FINE, supra note 66, at 9. See generally Sharon LaFraniere, The Grand Jury That
Couldn't, WASH. POST, Nov. 10, 1992, at Al, A4 (discussing the frustration of a grand jury
that wanted to bring an indictment but was not presented with one by the prosecutor).
132. FINE, supra note 66, at 9. In fact, no federal statute or judicial decision permits the
grand jury to obtain outside investigatory assistance; it depends solely upon the United
States Attorney. Comment, Powers of Federal Grand Juries, 4 STAN. L. REv. 68,70 (1951).
133. Currier, supra note 72, at 1080. But see REPORT ON PROSECUTIoN, supra note 9,
at 36 ("Where the number of prosecutions is large, it is hard for the grand jury in any
ordinary case to get at other facts than those presented to them, or even to know that it is
authorized to get at them.").
134. Brice, supra note 7, at 764.
135. 1 POLLOCK & MArrLAND, supra note 69, at 152; R.H. Helmholz, The Early History
of the Grand Jury and the Canon Law, 50 U. CHI. L. Rnv. 613, 613 (1983).
136. The qualifications which a person have in order to be a grand juror are minimal.
According to the Jury System Improvements Act of 1978, a prospective juror need simply
be a United States citizen; be at least eighteen years of age; be able to read, write, and
speak the English language; be physically and mentally able to serve; and not have been
charged or convicted of a felony. 28 U.S.C. § 1865 (1988). Federal grand jurors are chosen
"at random from a fair cross section of the community," and may not be excluded from
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must often make determinations of probable cause in cases such as in-
come tax evasion,137 mail138 and wire fraud, 139 and violations of the
Hobbs Act,"4 the Extortionate Credit Transaction Act, 41 the Racketeer
Influenced Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO),1 4 2 the Travel Act, 43 and
the antitrust laws.4
Thus, the modem grand jury has become more passive, coming to rely
more heavily upon the prosecutor.1 45 Such dependency has eroded the
grand jury's ability to be "independent and informed, 146 making it vul-
nerable to prosecutorial manipulation. 47 To remedy this problem, some
federal courts have exercised their inherent supervisory power to curb
prosecutorial abuse and to ensure the integrity of the grand jury process.
III. ExERCISE OF SUPERVISORY POWER
A. Overseeing Judicial Proceedings
The term supervisory power refers to the inherent authority of federal
courts to oversee their own proceedings. 148 The most distinctive aspect of
the supervisory power doctrine is that it is not rooted in any identifiable
constitutional or statutory provision, 149 but is justified by policy consider-
service on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or economic status." Id.
§§ 1861, 1862; see also BEALE & BRYSON, supra note 72, § 4:02, at 5-6.
137. 26 U.S.C. § 7201 (1988).
138. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (Supp. III 1991).
139. Id. § 1343.
140. Id. § 1951 (1988).
141. Id. §§ 891-894.
142. Id. § 1962.
143. Id. § 1952; see BEALE & BRYSON, supra note 72, § 1:06, at 34 n.5 (stating that the
Travel Act of 1961 creates criminal sanctions "for interstate travel intended to facilitate
gambling, narcotic traffic, prostitution, extortion, and bribery-illegal activities that are
often associated with organized crime").
144. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1988 & Supp. 1111991); see also Vaira, supra note 8, at 1144 (empha-
sizing the complexity of modem crimes).
145. See, e.g., United States v. Asdrubal-Herrera, 470 F. Supp. 939, 943 (N.D. Ill. 1979)
("The grand jury places great trust in the United States Attorney.").
146. United States v. Flomenhoft, 714 F.2d 708,711 (7th Cir. 1983) (citing United States
v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 573 (1976)). Courts have defined "independent and in-
formed" to mean that the grand jury "must be able to obtain all relevant evidence." Id.;
see also United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,343-44 (1974)); supra note 107 and accom-
panying text.
147. Currier, supra note 75, at 1080 (stating that jurors often believe a defendant must
be guilty simply because the government seeks an indictment against him).
148. Matthew E. Brady, Note, A Separation of Powers Approach to the Supervisory
Power of the Federal Courts, 34 STAN. L. REv. 427, 427 n.2 (1982).
149. See infra notes 151-53 and accompanying text. The supervisory power may be
justified as an implied power pursuant to Article III. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1 ("The judi-
cial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior
Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish."). Such "implied
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ations.' 50 The Supreme Court has explained the exercise of its supervi-
sory power as necessary to ensure the integrity of judicial proceedings'
51
and the reliability of evidence, 152 to redress transgressions of individual
rights, and to deter governmental misconduct. 15 3 The Court has exer-
cised its supervisory power in both criminal and civil cases,154 although it
has focused primarily on procedural and evidentiary issues in federal
judicial authority is analogous to... implied presidential authority." Sara S. Beale, Recon-
sidering Supervisory Power in Criminal Cases: Constitutional and Statutory Limits on the
Authority of the Federal Courts, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 1433, 1466 (1984). The authority is
also similar to the explicit congressional power to take all action "necessary and proper."
U.S. CONST art. I, § 8; see, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 n.16 (1974) (sug-
gesting that the President's authority includes all powers "reasonably appropriate and rele-
vant to the exercise of a granted power"); see also Beale, supra, at 1468 (stating that "every
constitutional grant of authority implicitly includes at least the incidental or ancillary au-
thority that is absolutely necessary to permit the exercise of the expressly granted
powers").
150. See infra notes 151-53 and accompanying text.
151. Id. at 427-28, 436. McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), is considered
"the first supervisory power decision." Beale, supra note 149, at 1435. In McNabb, the
Supreme Court excluded a defendant's confession from evidence because it was given after
a prolonged illegal detention. McNabb, 318 U.S. at 344-47. See generally Note, The Super-
visory Power of the Federal Courts, 76 HtLriv. L. Rv. 1656, 1660-63 (1963) (arguing that
the statutory power used by the Supreme Court in McNabb was really an attempt to con-
trol police activities and does not help in determining when a Court may use supervisory
power). In legitimizing such an assertion of power, the Court reasoned that federal courts
are obligated to maintain the integrity of judicial processes. McNabb, 318 U.S. at 340
("Judicial supervision of the administration of criminal justice in the federal courts implies
the duty of establishing and maintaining civilized standards of procedure and evidence.").
See also Ballard v. United States, 329 U.S. 187, 195 (1946) (stating that when women are
systematically excluded from jury service, the harm "is not limited to the defendant-there
is injury to the jury system, to the law as an institution, to the community at large, and to
the democratic ideal reflected in the processes of our courts"); United States v. Cederquist,
641 F.2d 1347, 1352 (9th Cir. 1981) (the goal of a court in dismissing an indictment on Fifth
Amendment Due Process grounds or upon its own inherent supervisory power, "is to pro-
tect the integrity of the judicial process"). Prior to McNabb, Congress alone regulated
federal judicial procedure. Where Congress failed to prescribe procedure by statute, fed-
eral courts relied on common law practices. See Beale, supra note 149, at 1435-38. In the
early twentieth century, a movement to establish a uniform set of rules governing judicial
procedure led to joint efforts between Congress and the Supreme Court to promulgate the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938 and the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in
1940. The Court's McNabb decision followed three years later. Id. at 1439-40.
152. See, e.g., Mesarosh v. United States, 352 U.S. 1, 14 (1956) (stating that "this Court
has supervisory jurisdiction over the proceedings of the federal courts," and that it "has...
(a] duty.., to see that the waters of justice are not polluted").
153. See, e.g., Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960) (holding that evidence ob-
tained by an unreasonable search and seizure is inadmissible upon defendant's timely ob-
jection); see also Beale, supra note 149, at 1455.
154. See e.g., Thiel v. Southern Pac. Co., 328 U.S. 217, 225 (1946) (exercising the
Court's supervisory power to strike a jury panel where wage earners had been intentionally
excluded, in order "to guard against the subtle undermining of the jury system"); see also
infra note 155.
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criminal cases.155 Under Chief Justice Burger, the Court began to cut
back sharply on the exercise of its supervisory power, a trend that has
continued to the present.156
B. Curbing Grand Jury Abuse
The Supreme Court has rarely considered matters of grand jury abuse,
and has considered only recently the exercise of supervisory power by the
federal courts157 to remedy grand jury abuse. 58 The Court has enforced
155. See, e.g., Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 190-92 (1981) (plurality
opinion) (exercising the Court's supervisory power to oversee voir dire procedure in order
to ensure the impaneling of an impartial jury); United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 231-
32 (1975) (exercising supervisory power to compel the production of investigative report
by defense); McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459, 471-72 (1969) (exercising supervi-
sory power to set aside a guilty plea and remove case for another hearing to comply with
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in
United States v. Goldberg, 862 F.2d 101 (6th Cir. 1988); Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S.
310, 312 (1959) (per curiam) (exercising supervisory power to require a new trial where
federal jurors had been exposed to pretrial publicity); Jencks v. United States, 353 U.S.
657, 667 (1957) (exercising supervisory power to require production of documents that are
relevant and not protected by an exclusionary rule), superseded by statute on other grounds
as stated in United States v. Gatto, 763 F.2d 1040 (9th Cir. 1985); Ballard, 329 U.S. at 193
(exercising its supervisory power "over the administration of justice" to require that jurors
in federal criminal cases are chosen from a fair cross section of community and do not
exclude women); see also Beale, supra note 149, at 1449-50 (providing examples of the use
of supervisory power by courts).
156. See Brady, supra note 148, at 432 (noting that neither the Warren Court nor the
Burger Court exercised supervisory power between 1963 and 1979).
157. One commentator has noted that "[a]lthough the source of the lower federal
courts' supervisory authority has not been identified, both the Supreme Court and the
lower federal courts have generally assumed that these courts possess supervisory author-
ity in their own circuits or districts like that wielded by the Supreme Court on a nationwide
level." Beale, supra note 149, at 1455.
Helwig v. United States, 162 F.2d 837 (6th Cir. 1947), is the first case in which a federal
court of appeals exercised its supervisory power to reverse a defendant's conviction and
order a new trial. The Supreme Court first recognized the exercise of supervisory power
by the lower federal courts in Bartone v. United States, 375 U.S. 52 (1963), where it found
that "in federal proceedings ... both the Courts of Appeals and this Court have broad
powers of supervision." Id. at 54 (citation omitted); see Beale, supra note 149, at 1455-56
n.157.
158. In the absence of definitive Supreme Court action, lower federal courts have un-
dertaken to supervise grand jury procedure. Historically, lower federal courts have cited at
least two sources of authority to justify the dismissal of indictments. See GERSHMAN, supra
note 119, § 2.2, at 2-5; Sarah A. Gardner, Comment, Confision in the Grand Jury: A New
Standard for Dismissal Based on Prosecutorial Misconduct, 55 BROOK. L. Rlv. 249,258-59
(1989). First, courts have dismissed indictments on constitutional grounds, where the pros-
ecutor has infringed the defendant's Fifth Amendment right to due process. See, e.g.,
United States v. Basurto, 497 F.2d 781, 787 (9th Cir. 1974) (reversing the defendant's con-
viction because it violated the defendant's due process rights to have him stand trial on
indictment that the Government procured through the use of material perjured testimony);
United States v. DeMarco, 401 F. Supp. 505, 514 (C.D. Cal. 1975) (dismissing an indict-
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statutory rules governing the grand jury, but has consistently refused to
exercise its own supervisory power to regulate the grand jury.159 It has
reasoned that because the grand jury is not textually assigned to any of
the three branches of federal government by the Constitution, it is a
wholly independent body that should remain unfettered from judicially-
imposed procedural rules.'
60
ment on due process grounds where the prosecutor, acting out of possibly vindictive mo-
tives, threatened to increase the charges if the defendant exercised his statutory venue
rights), aff'd, 550 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 827 (1977). But see United
States v. Cederquist, 641 F.2d 1347, 1352 (9th Cir. 1981) (reversing the dismissal of an
indictment based on the prosecutorial delay based on finding that there was no violation of
defendant's constitutional rights); United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1309 (9th Cir.)
(reversing the dismissal of an indictment based on the fact that the prosecutor presented
false evidence to a grand jury because such conduct was found not to be fundamentally
unfair to the defendant), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1977). When the abuse has not risen to
the level of a constitutional violation, courts have also dismissed indictments pursuant to
their inherent supervisory power. See, e.g., United States v. Serubo, 604 F.2d 807, 817-18
(3d Cir. 1979) (affirming the dismissal of an indictment because of prosecutorial miscon-
duct, even in absence of prejudice); United States v. Jacobs, 547 F.2d 772, 777 (2d Cir.
1976) (exercising supervisory power to dismiss a perjury indictment where the prosecutor
did not properly warn the grand jury witness that she was the target of the investigation),
cert. dismissed, 436 U.S. 31 (1978); United States v. Short, 777 F. Supp. 40, 42-43 (D.D.C.
1991); United States v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 435 F. Supp. 610, 618-19 (N.D. Okla. 1977);
supra note 25 and accompanying text; see also United States v. Hogan, 712 F.2d 757, 761-
62 (2d Cir. 1983) (reversing a conviction where the prosecutor impaired the grand jury's
independence by using hearsay evidence, introducing false testimony, and making inflam-
matory remarks); United States v. Estepa, 471 F.2d 1132, 1136-37 (2d Cir. 1972) (reversing
a defendant's conviction where the prosecutor misled the grand jury with hearsay evi-
dence). Cf. Cederquist, 641 F.2d at 1352; Chanen, 549 F.2d at 1309.
159. The Supreme Court, for instance, has declined to offer protection to grand jury
witnesses unless their claims rest on a recognized privilege. See, e.g., United States v. Ca-
landra, 414 U.S. 338, 351-52 (1974) (holding that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule
does not apply to grand jury proceedings); Blair v. United States, 250 U.S. 273, 282 (1919)
(holding that a subpoenaed grand jury witness had no standing to challenge the
investigation).
160. Beale, supra note 149, at 1459-60. Federal courts have sometimes categorized the
grand jury as an arm of the court. See, e.g., Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 617
(1960) ("The grand jury is an arm of the court and its in camera proceedings constitute 'a
judicial inquiry."' (quoting Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43, 66 (1906), overruled by Murphy v.
Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964))); Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 49 (1959)
(stating that the grand jury "remains an appendage of the court"), overruled by Harris v.
United States, 382 U.S. 162 (1965); Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 327 (1940)
("The Constitution itself makes the grand jury a part of the judicial process."); In re Grand
Jury Investigation of Cuisinarts, Inc., 665 F.2d 24, 31 (2d Cir. 1981) ("The grand jury... is
fundamentally an arm of the judiciary."), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1068 (1983); United States
v. Campanale, 518 F.2d 352, 366 (9th Cir. 1975) ("The grand jury is an appendage of the
court."), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1050 (1976); United States v. Stevens, 510 F.2d 1101, 1106
(5th Cir. 1975) (stating that the grand jury "is not an independent, self-contained entity
.... [But] is essentially an agency of the court. .. ."); Bursey v. United States, 466 F.2d
1059, 1082 (9th Cir. 1972) ("A grand jury is an arm of the judiciary, rather than an appen-
dage of the other branches of Government."); see also DiAmoND, supra note 2, § 1.02, at
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The Court has likewise been reluctant to use its supervisory power to
protect defendants who claim that they were indicted improperly. For
example, in Costello v. United States,16' the Court declined to invalidate
an indictment based solely on hearsay evidence.162 The Court explained
that an indictment founded on hearsay evidence does not amount to con-
stitutional error, and that the Court should not exercise its supervisory
power to review the sufficiency of evidence.
163
In two recent cases the Supreme Court indicated that the exercise of
supervisory power should be extremely restricted and that federal courts
should play a limited role with respect to the grand jury. In United States
v. Mechanik,""6 the Court held that the testimony of two law enforcement
agents who testified in tandem before the grand jury165 was harmless er-
ror because a petit jury ultimately found the defendants guilty.166  Con-
sidering the societal costs of retrial, the Court held that the petit jury's
subsequent guilty verdict was sufficient to establish probable cause to
support the initial indictment.1 67
11-12; Beale, supra, at 1459-60 n.183 (presenting views of grand jury as under the control of
the judiciary or the executive).
The grand jury has also been categorized as a prosecutorial arm of the Executive branch
of government. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 486 F.2d 85, 90 (3d Cir. 1973)
(stating that the grand jury is "for all practical purposes an investigative and prosecutorial
arm of the executive branch of government"); United States v. Cleary, 265 F.2d 459, 461
(2d Cir.) ("Basically the grand jury is a lav enforcement agency."), cert. denied, 360 U.S.
936 (1959); see also supra note 8 and accompanying text.
The grand jury has also been described as an autonomous institution, independent of
both the judicial and executive branches. See, e.g., Chanen, 549 F.2d at 1312; see also supra
note 191 and accompanying text.
161. 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
162. Id. at 363-64.
163. In Costello, the Court stated in broad terms that "[ain indictment returned by a
legally constituted and unbiased grand jury ... is enough to call for trial of the charge on
the merits." Id. at 363 (footnote omitted).
164. 475 U.S. 66 (1986).
165. Id. at 67. Only one witness at a time may testify before the grand jury. FED. R.
CRiM. P. 6(d).
166. Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 73.
167. Id. (stating that "the societal costs of retrial after a jury verdict of guilty are far too
substantial to justify setting aside the verdict simply because of an error in the earlier grand
jury proceedings"). In her concurring opinion in Mechanik, joined by Justices Brennan
and Blackmun, Justice O'Connor stated that "the analysis adopted by the Court for deter-
mining the effect of a violation of the rules governing the conduct of grand juries effec-
tively renders those rules a dead letter, thereby seriously undermining the grand jury's
traditional function of protecting the innocent from unwarranted public accusation." Id.
(O'Connor, J., concurring). Justice O'Connor concluded that "the remedy of dismissal of
the indictment is appropriate if it is established that the violation substantially influenced
the grand jury's decision to indict, or if there is grave doubt as to whether it had such
effect." Id. at 78; see also Brice, supra note 8, at 775 (stating that "the assumption [that a
petit jury's guilty verdict is sufficient to establish probable cause to support an indictment]
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Two years after Mechanik, the Supreme Court decided to reverse the
district court's dismissal of an indictment in Bank of Nova Scotia v.
United States.168 In that case, the district court had dismissed an indict-
ment on the grounds that the prosecutor mistreated and threatened to
withdraw immunity for a defense witness in order to manipulate his testi-
mony and also allowed an Internal Revenue Service (IRS) agent to sum-
marize evidence improperly. 69 The Court held in Bank of Nova Scotia
that "[i]n the exercise of its supervisory authority, a federal court 'may,
within limits, formulate procedural rules not specifically required by the
Constitution or the Congress."" 7 However, the Court stated that absent
a constitutional error, a federal court could not exercise its supervisory
power to dismiss an indictment unless "'it is established that the violation
substantially influenced the grand jury's decision to indict,' or if there is
'grave doubt' that the decision to indict was free from the substantial in-
fluence of such violations."''
C. Challenging an Indictment
It is extremely difficult for a defendant to challenge an indictment on
the grounds that prosecutorial misconduct tainted the grand jury's deter-
mination of probable cause.' 72 To obtain an evidentiary hearing because
of prosecutorial misconduct, the defendant must show that "grounds may
exist for a motion to dismiss the indictment because of matters occurring
before the grand jury."' 7 3 It is difficult for the defendant to meet this
proves too much: if the petit jury affords the defendant adequate protection, the modem
grand jury has no reason for being").
168. 487 U.S. 250, 254 (1988).
169. Id.
170. Id. (quoting United States v. Hastings, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983)).
171. Id. at 256 (quoting Mechanik, 475 U.S. at 78 (O'Connor, J., concurring)). In Nova
Scotia, the Supreme Court found that there was no evidence to show that the prosecutor's
misconduct may have "influenced substantially" or raised "grave doubt" about the grand
jury's decision to indict. Id. at 259-64.
172. See Vaira, supra note 8, at 1145. The most effective means for a court to preserve
grand jury procedure and discourage prosecutorial misconduct is to dismiss an indictment
tainted by abuse. See Anne Poulin, Supervision of the Grand Jury: Who Watches the
Guardian?, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 885, 898-903 (1990) (discussing the advantages and disad-
vantages of dismissing indictments as a remedy for prosecutorial misconduct). The threat
of dismissal is an especially effective prophylactic measure, since prosecutors are immune
from tort liability under federal common law for actions taken within the scope of their
duties. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430-31 (1976); see also United States v.
Roth, 777 F.2d 1200, 1202 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that "[g]iven the absolute immunity of
prosecutors from civil damage suits, it is hard to imagine what the legal sanction for this
[prosecutorial] misconduct would be unless it were dismissal of the indictment"); Anthony
J. Luppino, Note, Supplementing the Functional Test of Prosecutorial Immunity, 34 STAN .
L. Rnv. 487, 487-88 (1982).
173. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e)(3)(C)(ii).
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burden for several reasons. First, the misconduct is usually discovered
only after the indictment is issued because the defense attorney is ex-
cluded at all times from the grand jury room during its proceedings.' 7 4 In
addition, the defense is not given a full transcript of the proceedings
75
and can only obtain for trial those portions of the transcript relating to
grand jury witnesses called to testify at trial.176 Thus, the defense often
must obtain its evidence of misconduct from witnesses who testified
before the grand jury or from the grand jurors themselves. 77 Once an
indictment is returned, the grand jury proceedings are accorded a pre-
sumption of regularity1 78 that cannot be challenged on the sufficiency of
the evidence.
1 79
IV. UNTED STATES v. WLLAMs: A PROSECUTOR's DUTY TO
PRESENT SUBSTANTL-L EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE
In United States v. Williams, 80 the United States Supreme Court held
that the federal judiciary does not have the inherent authority to require
a prosecutor to disclose to a grand jury substantial exculpatory evidence
in his possession."81 By restricting the federal courts' exercise of supervi-
sory power, the Court prevented the judiciary from impinging upon the
grand jury's dual role."8 At the same time, however, the Court has not
lessened the potential threat of the executive to frustrate the grand jury's
protective function, and has further insulated alleged prosecutorial mis-
conduct before the grand jury from judicial review. But because the
grand jury is an institution separate from both the executive and the judi-
ciary, the Court has properly left the duty to preserve the integrity of the
grand jury process to the discretion of Congress.
A. The Majority Opinion: Restricting Supervisory Power
In Williams, the Supreme Court reversed a decision by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, and held that the federal
courts have no inherent authority to create a procedural rule requiring
the prosecutor to disclose substantial exculpatory evidence to the grand
174. See Poulin, supra note 172, at 910.
175. See Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 874-75 (1966).
176. See Poulin, supra note 172, at 927.
177. See id.
178. See Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87,139 n.23 (1974), superseded by statute as
stated in United States v. Petrov, 747 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1025
(1985).
179. United States v. Costello, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1956).
180. 112 S. Ct. 1735 (1992).
181. Id. at 1746.
182. Id. at 1744.
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jury."8 3 The majority decision was based on a finding that Williams inap-
propriately relied on Supreme Court precedent authorizing the federal
courts to use their inherent authority to create "'procedural rules not spe-
cifically required by the Constitution or Congress." ' 184 The Court con-
cluded that the cases that had previously relied on this authority only
concerned the federal courts' supervision of their own petit jury proceed-
ings, rather than grand jury proceedings. 8 5 The Court explained that
federal courts have the inherent authority to remedy misconduct that oc-
curs before the grand jury only if such misconduct violates a rule already
established by the Court and Congress,'86 but any authority federal
courts may have to create procedural rules governing grand jury proceed-
ings "is a very limited one."'" The Court based its restriction of the in-
herent authority of the federal judiciary over the grand jury on the grand
jury's traditional autonomy.1
88
The Court decided that the federal judiciary's exercise of its supervi-
sory power to require a prosecutor to disclose substantial exculpatory evi-
dence to the grand jury was inappropriate because the grand jury is
independent of the judiciary."8 9 Looking to the structure of the United
States Constitution, the Court reasoned that because the Framers pro-
vided for the grand jury in the Bill of Rights, rather than in the first three
183. Id. at 1746.
184. Id. at 1741 (quoting United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505 (1983)).
185. Id. (explaining that Hastings and the cases "that rely upon the principle it ex-
presses, deal strictly with the courts' power to control their own procedures").
186. Id. The Court stated that a federal court's supervisory power can be used to dis-
miss an indictment because of misconduct before the grand jury, at least where that mis-
conduct amounts to a violation of one of those "few, clear rules which were carefully
drafted and approved by this Court and by Congress to ensure the integrity of the grand
jury's functions." Id. (quoting United States v. Mechanik, 475 U.S. 66, 74 (1986)
(O'Connor, J., concurring)).
The Court cites both the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which states that "no
person other than the jurors may be present while the grand jury is deliberating or voting,"
FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(e), and the relevant provisions of the United States Code that "set[ I
forth procedures for granting a witness immunity from prosecution," 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002-
6003 (1988), "prohibit[ I grand jury use of unlawfully intercepted wire or oral communica-
tions," id. § 2515, and "criminaliz[e] subornations of perjury." Id. § 1622.
187. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1744. The court stated that "any power federal courts may
have to fashion, on their own initiative, rules of grand jury procedure is a very limited one,
not remotely comparable to the power they maintain over their own proceedings." Id.
(citing United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1313 (9th Cir), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825
(1977)).
188. Id. at 1742.
189. Id. "Because the grand jury is an institution separate from the courts, over whose
functioning the courts do not preside, we think it clear that, as a general matter at least, no
such 'supervisory' judicial authority exists, and that the disclosure rule applied here ex-
ceeded the Tenth Circuit's authority." Id.
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Articles of the Constitution, the grand jury is independent and "belongs
to no branch of the institutional government."190 Implicitly drawing
upon the doctrine of separation of powers, the Court reasoned that the
grand jury is an autonomous body19' which has historically stood between
the government and the individual."9
The Court conceded that the separation of the grand jury from the ju-
diciary has not been absolute, but insisted that the grand jury has main-
tained a "functional independence."' 93 The Court acknowledged that the
judiciary is directly involved in the grand jury process in some ways,194
but concluded that because such involvement is extremely limited 95 and
because the grand jury wields very broad investigatory power,196 the
190. Id.
191. Id. The Court observed that the grand jury ""'is a constitutional fixture in its own
right."' Id. (quoting Chanen, 549 F.2d at 1312 (quoting Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700,712,
n.54 (D.C. Cir. 1973))).
192. Id. (stating'that the grand jury serves "as a kind of buffer or referee between the
Government and the people").
193. Id. The Court recognized that the grand jury "normally operates ... in the court-
house and under judicial auspices," but insisted that this "institutional relationship" has
always been "at arm's length." Id.
194. Id. The majority recognized that a judge usually assembles grand jurors and ad-
ministers their oath of offices. Id.
195. Id. The Court also explained that an individual before a grand jury lacks "certain
constitutional protections" otherwise accorded the defendant at trial. Id. at 1743. The
Court stated, for instance, that the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment does
not prevent a grand jury from indicting an individual for a crime for which a previous
grand jury did not. Id. (citing Ex parte United States, 287 U.S. 241, 250-51 (1932); United
States v. Thompson, 251 U.S. 407,413-15 (1920)). The Court noted that it has "suggested"
that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel does not arise when an individual testifies as a
grand jury witness, or is the "subject of the investigation." Id. (citing FaD. R. Ciurv. P.
6(d); United States v. Mandujano, 425 U.S. 564, 581 (1976) (plurality opinion); In re
Groban, 352 U.S. 330,333 (1957)). The Court stated that an indictment based on evidence
procured in violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination "'is nev-
ertheless valid."' Id. (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 346 (1974)); see
also United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251, 255 n.3 (1966); Lawn v. United States, 355 U.S.
339, 348-50 (1958). The Court also pointed out that evidence obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment and hearsay evidence are admissible in a grand jury proceeding. Blue,
384 U.S. at 255 n.3; see Calandra, 414 U.S. at 349; Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359,
76 (1956).
196. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1742. The Court cited, for instance, that the grand jury has
the power to commence an investigation on the mere suspicion of criminal activity, need
not identify the offense or suspects under investigation, swears its own witnesses, and con-
ducts its proceedings in secrecy and without a presiding judge. Id.
The majority also found that despite the fact that a grand jury must rely upon the court
to compel compliance with a grand jury subpoena for "the appearance of witnesses and the
production of evidence," and that the court may quash or limit a grand jury subpoena if it
infringes upon constitutional or common law rights, the grand jury is still free indepen-
dently to pursue its investigation. Id. at 1743. The majority stated that the Court has
"insisted that the grand jury remain 'free to pursue its investigations unhindered by exter-
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grand jury has maintained an "operational separateness" upon which fed-
eral courts may not infringe. 197
The Court also rejected Williams' argument that, based on the "'com-
mon law"' of the Fifth Amendment, such a rule requiring disclosure of
substantial exculpatory evidence would enhance the grand jury's ability
to render an "'independent and informed"' judgment.198 Drawing on
English history, the Court found that a defendant has never had the right
to testify before the grand jury or to have favorable evidence presented
on his behalf.' 99 To impose such a disclosure requirement on the prose-
cutor would run counter to grand jury procedure as established by the
common law, because it would allow a defendant to "circumnavigate the
system";2 °0 the defendant could effectively tender a full defense by pro-
viding the prosecutor with all exculpatory evidence, thereby forcing the
prosecutor to reveal it to the grand jury or risk having the indictment
dismissed on appeal.20' The Court reasoned that such a duty would per-
vert the traditional function of the grand jury: no longer would the grand
jury assess the evidence to determine probable cause, rather, it would be
forced to decide a defendant's guilt or innocence.20 2
The Court concluded that requiring the prosecutor to present substan-
tial exculpatory evidence to a grand jury would violate the common law
nal influence or supervision so long as it does not trench upon the legitimate rights of any
witness called before it."' Id. (quoting United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1973)).
197. Id. at 1743. The Court stated that "the Fifth Amendment's 'constitutional guaran-
tee presupposes an investigative body "acting independently of either prosecuting attorney
or judge." .. ."' Id. (quoting Dionisio, 410 U.S. at 16 (quoting Stirone v. United States, 361
U.S. 212, 218 (1960))).
198. Id. at 1744 (quoting Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375, 390 (1962)).
199. Id. Citing the opinion "of an early American court, three years before the Fifth
Amendment was ratified," the Court stated that "it is the grand jury's function not 'to
enquire ... upon what foundation [the charge may be] denied,' or otherwise to try the
suspects defenses, but only to examine 'upon what foundation [the charge] is made' by the
prosecutor." Id. (citing Respublica v. Shaffer, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 236 (1788) (alterations in
original)).
200. Id. at 1745.
201. Id. The Court stated:
Imposing upon the prosecutor a legal obligation to present exculpatory evi-
dence in his possession would be incompatible with this [grand jury] system. If a
"balanced" assessment of the entire matter is the objective, surely the first thing
to be done-rather than requiring the prosecutor to say what he knows in defense
of the target of the investigation-is to entitle the target to tender his own de-
fense. To require the former while denying (as we do) the latter would be quite
absurd.
Id.
202. Id. at 1744 (stating that "requiring the prosecutor to present exculpatory as well as
inculpatory evidence would alter the grand jury's historical role, transforming it from an
accusatory to an adjudicatory body").
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principle that the defendant has never had the right to challenge the suffi-
ciency of the evidence upon which a grand jury returned a true bill.203
Rejecting Williams' argument that a disclosure requirement would "save
valuable judicial time,"2" the Court reasoned that the process of review-
ing motions challenging indictments as unjustified is also time-consuming,
and may yield no net benefit.2"5 The majority concluded that only Con-
gress has the power to impose a prosecutorial disclosure requirement.20 6
B. Justice Stevens' Dissent: Preventing Prosecutorial Misconduct
In dissent, Justice Stevens explicitly rejected the majority's strict sepa-
ration of powers analysis and concluded that the federal judiciary has am-
ple inherent authority to impose, on its own initiative, a prosecutorial
duty to disclose substantial exculpatory evidence to a grand jury.20 7 Jus-
tice Stevens emphasized that a prosecutor assumes a special role20"
before a grand jury and may seriously abuse such authority.2 9 Interpret-
ing Supreme Court precedent, in particular Bank of Nova Scotia v. United
203. Id. The Court noted that "[m]otions to quash indictments based upon the suffi-
ciency of the evidence relied upon by the grand jury were unheard of at common law in
England." Id. at 1745 (citation omitted). In looking to American history, the Court
quoted Justice Nelson riding Circuit in 1852:
"No case has been cited, nor have we been able to find any, furnishing an au-
thority for looking into and revising the judgment of the grand jury upon the
evidence, for the purpose of determining whether or not the finding was founded
upon sufficient proof, or whether there was a deficiency in respect to any part of
the complaint ......
Id. (quoting United States v. Reed, 27 F. Cas. 727,738 (C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1852) (No. 16,134)).
In Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956), the Court wrote:
If indictments were to be held open to challenge on the ground that there was
inadequate or incompetent evidence before the grand jury, the resulting delay
would be great indeed .... An indictment returned by a legally constituted and
unbiased grand jury, . . . if valid on its face, is enough to call for trial of the
charges on the merits. The Fifth Amendment requires nothing more.
Id. at 363 (footnote omitted); see also Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245, 248 (1910).
204. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1746.
205. Id.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 1751-52 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
208. Id. at 1750-51 (emphasizing that a prosecutor's role as a "grand jury adviser. ...
[M]ust take precedence" over his duties as an advocate since he is a representative of the
United States government).
209. Id. at 1749-50. Justice Stevens catalogued the sorts of abusive "tactics" that an
"overzealous" prosecutor may utilize. Id. at 1749. Justice Stevens stated that in grand jury
proceedings in particular, prosecutors have presented perjured testimony, examined wit-
nesses outside the presence of the grand jury and then did not reveal such exculpatory
evidence to the jurors, did not advise the grand jury of its power to subpoena witnesses,
and misstated the law and facts. Id. at 1749-50.
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States,21° Justice Stevens concluded that the federal courts do have the
supervisory power to dismiss an indictment because of prosecutorial
misconduct.211
Unlike the majority, Justice Stevens found that the federal judiciary's
imposition of a prosecutorial disclosure rule was an appropriate exercise
of supervisory power, because the grand jury is not wholly autonomous,
but rather falls within the purview of the federal courts.21 2 Justice Ste-
vens explained that regardless of whether the grand jury is "'textually
assigned"' 213 by the Constitution to any one of the three branches of gov-
ernment, the grand jury is subject to judicial control "[t]hroughout its
life.",214 Unlike the majority, Justice Stevens found it critical that the
grand jury is "'powerless'" 215 to fulfill its investigatory role without court
intervention.216
Justice Stevens pointed out, moreover, that the majority readily admit-
ted that the grand jury is subject to the direct control of both Congress
and the federal judiciary. In addition to stating that Congress "'is free to
prescribe'" 217 a prosecutorial disclosure rule, the majority conceded that
210. 487 U.S. 250 (1988).
211. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1751. Unlike the majority, Justice Stevens interpreted
Court precedent, particularly Bank of Nova Scotia and United States v. Mechanik, 475
U.S. 66 (1986), to mean that in order to dismiss an indictment on the basis of prosecutorial
misconduct a court need not find that a prosecutor violated a particular rule. Williams, 112
S. Ct. at 1752. According to Justice Stevens, dismissal is warranted where a court finds that
prosecutorial misconduct "played a critical role in persuading the jury to return the indict-
ment," regardless of whether there is a pre-existing rule specifically barring such miscon-
duct. Id. at 1752-53.
Justice Stevens stated that "[u]nrestrained prosecutorial misconduct in grand jury pro-
ceedings is inconsistent with the administration of justice in the federal courts and should
be redressed in appropriate cases by the dismissal of indictments obtained by improper
methods." Id. at 1753.
212. Id. at 1752.
213. Id. (stating that "[a]lthough the grand jury has not been 'textually assigned' to 'any
of the branches described in the first three Articles' of the Constitution, it is not an autono-
mous body completely beyond the reach of the other branches" (quoting id. at 1742 (ma-
jority opinion)).
214. Id. (stating that "from the moment it is convened until it is discharged, the grand
jury is subject to the control of the court").
215. Id. (quoting Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41, 49 (1959), overruled by Morris v.
United States, 382 U.S. 162 (1965)).
216. Id. Justice Stevens stated:
"A grand jury is clothed with great independence in many areas, but it remains an
appendage of the court, powerless to perform its investigative function without
the court's aid, because powerless itself to compel the testimony of witnesses. It
is the court's process which summons the witness to attend and give testimony,
and it is the court which must compel a witness to testify if, after appearing, he
refuses to do so."
Id. (quoting Brown, 359 U.S. at 49).
217. Id. at 1752 n.10.
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federal courts have the power to modify or quash a grand jury subpoena
that violates "'the Constitution, statutes, or the common law.""' Justice
Stevens concluded, therefore, that the grand jury enjoys wide discretion
in executing its investigatory powers, not because the federal judiciary
lacks the power to impose rules, but simply because it has declined to do
SO.
2 1 9
Justice Stevens also rejected the majority's conclusion that the imposi-
tion of a prosecutorial disclosure rule would "alter" the grand jury's his-
torical function, transforming it from an accusatory to an adjudicatory
body."' Emphasizing the protective function of the grand juryfll and the
ex parte natureM of its proceedings, the dissent recognized the strong
need for a prosecutorial disclosure rule to preserve the integrity2 of the
grand jury and to protect it from prosecutorial abuse. '4
Justice Stevens agreed with the majority that to require a prosecutor to
present all exculpatory evidence to the grand jury would be burdensome
for the prosecutor and would be "inconsistent" with the grand jury's func-
tion.'2 The dissent, however, maintained that to permit a prosecutor to
withhold evidence that would otherwise preclude a finding of probable
cause by the grand jury undermines the constitutional function of the
grand jury.
2 6
218. Id at 1752 (quoting United States v. Caladra, 414 U.S. 338, 346 (1974)).
219. Id. Justice Stevens stated that the grand jury investigatory power "'is unrestrained
by the technical procedural and evidentiary rules governing the conduct of criminal trials.'
... [B]ecause Congress and the Court have generally thought it best not to impose proce-
dural restraints on the grand jury; ... not because they lack all power to do so." Id.
(quoting Calandra, 414 U.S. at 343).
220. Id. at 1753.
221. Id "After all, the grand jury is not merely an investigatory body; it also serves as a
'protector of citizens against arbitrary and oppressive governmental action."' Id. (quoting
Calandra, 414 U.S. at 343).
222. Id at 1750 (stating that when before a grand jury, "'the prosecutor operates with-
out the check of a judge or a trained legal adversary, and virtually immune from public
scrutiny"' (quoting United States v. Serbo, 604 F.2d 807, 817 (3d Cir. 1979))).
223. Id. at 1753. Justice Stevens stated that "[w]e do not protect the integrity and inde-
pendence of the grand jury by closing our eyes to the countless forms of prosecutorial
misconduct that may occur inside the secrecy of the grand jury room." Id.
224. Id. "It blinks reality to say that the grand jury can adequately perform this impor-
tant [protective] role if it is intentionally misled by the prosecutor-on whose knowledge
of the law and facts of the underlying criminal investigation the jurors will, of necessity,
rely." Id.
225. Id. at 1753-54.
226. Id
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V. PRESERVING THE AUrTONOMY AND FUNCTION
OF THE GRAND JURY
The key issue in Williams was the proper scope of the federal courts'
supervisory power over the grand jury. While both the majority and dis-
sent agreed that federal courts may, in appropriate circumstances, invoke
their inherent power to oversee judicial proceedings, the Court divided as
to the appropriateness of exercising such power to regulate grand jury
procedure. Exercising a philosophy of judicial self-restraint, the majority
adopted the better rule.
For the majority, the resolution of the issue was dictated by the lesson
of history ' 7 and Supreme Court precedent. The majority was correct to
accord great weight to the fact that the grand jury is separate from and
fundamentally different than the judiciary. To allow the federal courts to
fashion a prosecutorial disclosure rule would have had serious negative
consequences on this traditional separation. First, such a rule would have
threatened the traditionally ex parte and secret nature of grand jury
proceedings by requiring the prosecutor to tender a defense for the ac-
cused," 8 as well as by exposing both the prosecutor's evidentiary presen-
tation and grand jury proceedings to searching court review. Second,
allowing the federal courts to impose such a rule would impinge upon the
executive's own exercise of power and discretion by dictating what evi-
dence the prosecutor must present to a grand jury.2 9 Third, permitting
227. Looking to both English and American history, the majority found no justification
for imposing such a disclosure requirement. First, the defendant has never had the right to
present his side of the case to a grand jury. Id. at 1745 (majority opinion); see also supra
note 16. Second, the prosecutor has never had a duty to present exculpatory evidence to a
grand jury. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1744; see also supra note 16. Third, the grand jury was
never obligated to consider exculpatory evidence. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1745. The Court
posited:
The authority of the prosecutor to seek an indictment has long been understood
to be "coterminous with the authority of the grand jury to entertain [the prosecu-
tor's] charges." If the grand jury has no obligation to consider all "substantial
exculpatory" evidence, we do not understand how the prosecutor can be said to
have a binding obligation to present it.
Id. (quoting United States v. Thompson, 251 U.S. 407, 414 (1920)); see also supra note 15.
And lastly, an indictment has never been successfully challenged on the quantity or quality
of evidence supporting it. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1745 ("Motions to quash indictments
based upon the sufficiency of the evidence relied upon by the grand jury were unheard of
at common law in England." (citation omitted)); see also supra note 196.
228. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
229. United States v. Chanen, 549 F.2d 1306, 1312-13 (9th Cir.) (stating that "initiating
a criminal case by presenting evidence before the grand jury-qualifies as 'an executive
function within the exclusive prerogative of the Attorney General"' (quoting In re Persico,
522 F.2d 41, 54-55 (2d Cir. 1975))), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 825 (1977).
The Chanen court also stated that:
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the federal courts to make such an assertion of power would lay danger-
ous precedent for future judicial encroachment upon the role of the grand
jury.
By making such a strict, albeit correct, reading of history, however, the
Court failed to address the fact that modem exigencies have shifted the
balance of power in the grand jury room and have allowed the prosecutor
to assume a position of unprecedented influence.3 0 In light of the ex
parte and secret nature of grand jury proceedings," 1 there is a tremen-
dous potential for the prosecutor to abuse the grand jury." 2 The dissent
addressed this issue head-on when it highlighted the special role a prose-
cutor serves 3 and then identified the many types of prosecutorial mis-
conduct that may occur before the grand juryP3 4
While the dissent clearly identified the problem of prosecutorial abuse
of the grand jury and its debilitating effect on the grand jury's protective
capacity'2 5 Justice Stevens overstated the federal courts' inherent power
to fashion a procedural remedy. 3 6 The dissent reasoned, in effect, that
two wrongs make a right: if the executive impinges upon the indepen-
dence of the grand jury, then it is justifiable for the judiciary to do so in
response.3 7 Although this theory of checks and balances is authorized,
and is necessary, to maintain the balance of power between the judiciary,
the executive, and Congress, the doctrine does not apply as readily to the
relationship between the judiciary, the executive, and the grand jury. The
federal courts' exercise of their inherent power must be restricted in light
of the fact the grand jury was intended to be autonomous, free of both
executive and judicial interference.
"An attorney for the United States, as any other attorney, however, appears in
a dual role. He is at once an officer of the court and the agent and attorney for a
client; in the first capacity he is responsible to the Court for the manner of his
conduct of a case, i.e., his demeanor, deportment and ethical conduct; but in his
second capacity, as agent and attorney for the Executive, he is responsible to his
principal and the courts have no power over the exercise of his discretion or his
motives as they relate to the execution of his duty within the framework of his
professional employment."
Id. at 1313 n.5 (quoting Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 481 (D.C. Cir. 1967)).
230. See supra notes 124-42 and accompanying text.
231. See supra notes 117, 123 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 124-42 and accompanying text.
233. Williams v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1735, 1750 (1992) (Stevens, J., dissenting); see
also supra notes 112-16, 207 and accompanying text.
234. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1749-50; see also supra note 208 and accompanying text.
235. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1749-50; see supra notes 207-08 and accompanying text; see
also supra notes 125-47 and accompanying text.
236. Williams, 112 S. Ct. at 1751, 1754.
237. 1d.
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In an effort to prevent judicial encroachment upon the grand jury by
narrowly construing the federal courts' supervisory power, the majority
focused its attention on the grand jury's accusatory role, and permitted
the executive to potentially threaten the grand jury's protective function.
Given the constitutionally-mandated independence of the grand jury
from the control of both the executive and the judiciary, it is proper for
Congress to decide whether to regulate the internal procedure of the
grand jury. If the Congress enacted such procedural regulations, the fed-
eral judiciary could then act within the appropriate scope of its inherent
authority to interpret and preserve the explicit intent of Congress.
VI. CONCLUSION
If the Fifth Amendment right to a grand jury indictment is to provide
any protection to an accused, it must, at a minimum, ensure that the
grand jury is prepared to make an informed and impartial determination
of probable cause. By restricting the federal courts' supervisory power
and denying the courts the authority to impose a prosecutorial disclosure
rule, the Williams Court has properly acknowledged that the federal judi-
ciary does not have the same degree of control over grand jury proceed-
ings as it does over its own judicial proceedings. Thus, given the tripartite
nature of grand jury proceedings, as the grand jury becomes more depen-
dant upon the prosecutor, and the prosecutor's power increases as a re-
sult, Congress may have to act to maintain the integrity and autonomy of
the grand jury, and prevent the grand jury from once again becoming,
like the Assize of Clarendon, an arm of the executive.
Susan M. Schiappa
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